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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy has been provided by the Australian Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the authors’ own and 
not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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THINK20: PROGRESS REPORT 
ON AUSTRALIA’S G20 
PRESIDENCY 
 
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
Lowy Institute for International Policy 
 
OVERVIEW 
This report provides an assessment on how things are progressing in 
2014 under Australia’s G20 presidency, from the perspectives of 
Think20 participants. This follows on from their original assessment of 
challenges and policy recommendations discussed at the Think20 
meeting held on 11 December 2013.2 As background, the Think20 
members were referred to Prime Minister Abbott’s address to the World 
Economic Forum,3 Treasurer Hockey’s speech on ‘Australia’s Role in 
Strengthening International Consultation and Cooperation’,4 and the 
communiqué from the meeting of G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors held on 21-23 February 2014.5 The contributions contain 
a range of views on Australia’s progress to date as G20 chair. 
 
OVERALL APPROACH 
There is broad endorsement for Australia’s overall objective of having a 
more focused agenda (as Prime Minister Abbott said, a focus on a “few 
                                                
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 Participant’s original assessment of the challenges in four main G20 agenda 
areas (economics/finance, trade, infrastructure and development are collected 
in Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen, eds., Think20 Papers 2014: Policy 
Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2013). 
3 Tony Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (23 January, 2014),” http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-
01-23/address-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland-0. 
4 Joe Hockey, “Australia's Role in Strengthening International Consultation 
and Cooperation, Address to the Lowy Institute (6 February, 2014),” 
http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/speech/001-2014/. 
5 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
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key subjects”6) and producing outcomes rather than just talking. 
However, a number of contributors note that they are still waiting to see 
what will be the ‘few key subjects’ that will be the focus of the Brisbane 
Summit. 
The overarching objective of promoting growth and creating jobs is 
endorsed. But it is pointed out by a number of contributors, including 
Barry Carin, Stephen Pickford, and myself, that Australia still in fact has 
a long agenda, consisting of 10 streams of work. Pickford observes that 
taking forward 10 separate and difficult agenda items with equal vigour is 
bound to distract from main priorities. He says Australia still has to 
prioritise its efforts and negotiating capital. Ye Yu comments that 88 
separate documents were released under the Russian presidency in 
2013 and Australia has released 10 documents in the first quarter of 
2014. 
Katharina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker note that for the G20 to be 
effective, the presidency has to ensure that value is added to the pursuit 
of members’ individual economic policies and the agenda has to be 
concise. The need for the G20 to add value is particularly pertinent given 
that many issues on the agenda are primarily domestic issues. A 
number of commentators emphasise that the G20 has to more 
effectively demonstrate international cooperation in 2014. Guven Sak 
believes that unilateral action by some central banks has weakened 
cooperation, and Jose Siaba Serrate calls for better communication and 
cooperation on monetary policy. 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
As noted, while a number of Think20 experts comment on the continuing 
large G20 agenda, some express concern that climate change has been 
dropped from the agenda by Australia in 2014. Rei Tang observes that 
while Australia has been quiet about climate change issues, other G20 
members will want these items on the agenda. Andrés Rozental notes 
his disappointment that climate change is not on the agenda, as do I. 
Carin, however, says that it is wise to resist calls for the G20 to rescue 
the climate change negotiations. 
 
TWO PER CENT GROWTH ‘AIM’ 
The aim to lift global growth by another 2 per cent over 5 years, which 
was endorsed by G20 finance ministers at their meeting in February, 
                                                
6 Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, 
Switzerland (23 January, 2014)”. 
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receives many comments. Sergey Drobyshevsky and Pavel Trunin note 
that while the aim itself is positive, it is vague and subject to different 
interpretations. In a similar vein, Pickford points out that while it may 
signal intent, the aim will be hard to verify. Christophe Destais indicates 
that it may help shift the focus towards lifting growth rather than the 
emphasis being on rebalancing growth, although he warns that the G20 
should not give up on coordinating macroeconomic policy. Gnath and 
Schmucker suggest the 2 per cent aim is meaningless unless it is 
supported by a consistent strategy of action and it may, in fact, be 
counterproductive if it weakens the Mutual Assessment Process. Ye Yu 
also observes that a collective target is only meaningful if supported by 
collective action. And I note that the growth aim will only be meaningful if 
it results in a change of approach by G20 members and if they 
implement the difficult domestic reforms identified by the international 
organisations as being necessary to lift growth. 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 
On the objective of lifting infrastructure investment, Destais notes that 
while investment is a key to increasing potential growth in many 
countries, the situation varies greatly among countries. Gnath and 
Schmucker warn that the infrastructure objective will become an empty 
shell if members do not agree on concrete steps that form part of an 
overall consistent strategy. Maria Wihardja notes that increased private 
sector investment is not a panacea to lift spending on infrastructure and 
Ye Yu says the G20 should take a more balanced position on the 
complementary roles of public and private investment. Yong Wang 
suggests there should be greater cooperation between the G20 and 
APEC in 2014. 
 
TRADE 
A number of contributors suggest that trade should be a focus of the 
G20 in 2014, although note that Australia has not given much indication 
as to what it will be seeking to achieve in this area. Gnath and 
Schmucker suggest the focus should be to strengthen the multilateral 
trading system, a point I also endorse in my paper. Pickford argues that 
with the WTO seemingly incapable of making progress, the G20 should 
concentrate on plurilateral structures. Drobyshevsky and Trunin call for 
the focus of the trade agenda to be on the role of global value chains, 
while Yong Wang suggests that the G20 agenda and China’s APEC 
agenda should be working towards the early conclusion of the WTO 
Round and a more open regional trading system in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
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TAX 
Work on combatting tax evasion and profit shifting is endorsed, with 
Destais noting that the commitment to progress work in this area as 
expressed in the finance ministers’ February 2014 communiqué was 
much clearer compared with the language on financial regulatory issues. 
Pickford observes that for all its good analytical work, the OECD does 
not appear to have the political clout to get full international agreement to 
harmonise tax policies, including countries that are not members of the 
OECD. 
 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Destais expresses reservations over the ambiguous wording on financial 
regulation in the February ministerial communiqué, noting that neither 
the word ‘financial regulation’ nor the Financial Stability Board is 
mentioned. Yong Wang believes that a “more workable” agenda on 
banking and financing issues is required, including a scheduled action 
plan for the implementation of reforms. 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
On development, John Kirton points out that Brisbane will be the last 
chance for the G20 to provide the needed leadership and guidance to 
the United Nations post-2015 development goal process, as successor 
goals to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be launched in 
2015. To enhance accountability, he also calls for development issues to 
return to the Framework and the Mutual Assessment Process. Carin 
calls for “empowering development” by linking development actions to 
growth, and creating the conditions for developing countries to attract 
infrastructure investment, strengthen tax systems, and improve access 
to financial services. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Australia is one-third of the way through its G20 presidency year. The 
papers in this report suggest a cautious optimism around Australia’s 
progress and leadership so far. Rozental notes in his paper that Mexico 
has a vested interest in keeping the G20 “alive and relevant beyond the 
current financial crisis”. It is a sentiment shared by all in the Think20. The 
aim of this report is to contribute to such an outcome by offering some 
constructive comments. 
…vested interest in 
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INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF 
AUSTRALIA’S G20 
PRESIDENCY 
 
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
Lowy Institute for International Policy 
 
Australia is approaching the halfway mark in its term as chair of the G20 
in 2014. It is therefore a fitting time to provide an interim assessment of 
how it is going. 
AUSTRALIA’S APPROACH 
Prime Minister Abbott laid out in his first, and to date only, speech on the 
G20 in Davos in January that the objective is for the Brisbane Summit to 
focus on a “few key subjects”.2 He noted that the G20 “must be more 
than a talkfest”.3 This was echoed by Treasury Hockey in a speech 
delivered in early February, where he stated that the G20 “must not be a 
talkfest, it must be a place for decisions and actions”.4 A focused 
approach to achieving outcomes through the G20 should be fully 
endorsed, along with the Prime Minister’s commitment to a three-page 
communiqué from the Brisbane Summit. The question is, however, what 
will be the ‘few key areas’ that will be the focus of the Brisbane Summit 
and what outcomes will be sought in those areas? 
 
AUSTRALIA’S PRIORITIES 
The official G20 website for Australia’s presidency is not very informative 
in identifying the key areas that will be the focus of leaders’ attention at 
the Brisbane Summit. Australia has divided its objectives for the G20 
under two broad themes: 
                                                
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 Tony Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (23 January, 2014),” http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-
01-23/address-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland-0. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Joe Hockey, “Australia's Role in Strengthening International Consultation 
and Cooperation, Address to the Lowy Institute (6 February, 2014),” 
http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/speech/001-2014/. 
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• Promoting stronger economic growth and employment outcomes. 
• Making the global economy more resilient to deal with future shocks. 
But ten work streams, which continue areas that were previously on the 
G20 agenda, are also listed. They are: trade, employment, development, 
anti-corruption, energy, investment and infrastructure, fiscal and 
monetary policy, tax, reforming global institutions, and financial 
regulation.5  
In his February speech, Treasurer Hockey said that Australia’s G20 
agenda was “simple, uncluttered and focused” and that Australia was 
“not adding anything to the existing agenda, but rather honing in on the 
most strategic priorities”.6 He is certainly right on the last point. Australia 
has, in fact, taken something off the G20 agenda: climate change. This 
is disappointing. 
But as noted, the existing agenda is still a long one and it remains to be 
seen what will be the ‘few key areas’ that will be the focus of the leaders’ 
meeting. And it will need a strong focus if the Brisbane Summit is to be 
remembered for achieving something significant. As Chris Giles from the 
Financial Times has noted, it is much easier for a reporter to tell their 
news editor in a sentence (or a headline) that the G20 has achieved 
progress in a single area than it is to explain incremental changes across 
a wide variety of work streams.7 If Australia wants the Brisbane Summit 
to be seen as having achieved significant progress on an international 
issue, it will need a ‘headline act’. 
The Prime Minister did give a hint as to what the headline act at the 
Brisbane Summit may be when he said in his Davos speech: “As 
always, trade comes first”.8 He went on to say that the G20 should 
renew its commitment against protectionism, undo protectionist 
measures put in place since the crisis, and each country should commit 
to open up trade through domestic reforms to help business engage 
more fully in global commerce.9 Trade would be a highly appropriate 
area for leaders to focus on at an international economic summit. In 
                                                
5 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “G20 2014: Overview of 
Australia's Presidency,” 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/G20Australia201
4conceptpaper.pdf. 
6 Joe Hockey, “Australia's G20 Agenda, Address to the Institute of 
International Finance (20 February, 2014),” 
http://www.joehockey.com/media/speeches/details.aspx?s=127. 
7 Mike Callaghan, “Strengthening the Core of the G20: Clearer Objectives, 
Better Communication, Greater Transparency and Accountability,” (Sydney: 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013). 
8 Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, 
Switzerland (23 January, 2014)”. 
9 Ibid. 
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particular, the G20 could demonstrate its credentials as a global steering 
committee if the Brisbane Summit was seen as the occasion when 
leaders started the process of breathing life back into the multilateral 
trading system and multilateral liberalisation. While there will be a G20 
trade ministers meeting in June 2014, it remains to be seen whether 
advancing trade liberalisation will be a major focus for the Brisbane 
Summit. 
In his Davos speech, the Prime Minister said that the G20 would 
continue its work on combatting tax evasion and tax avoidance.10 
Treasurer Hockey also highlighted that the G20 will respond to the 
erosion of domestic tax bases resulting from international tax planning 
that takes advantage of the gaps in current taxation systems.11 The 
international response is being focused through the OECD, which has a 
15-point action plan that it is advancing through 2014 and 2015. This is a 
complex and controversial area. The OECD will provide 
recommendations along with ‘soft law’; commitments that are not legally 
binding. This work will therefore not have an impact until it is 
implemented and changes made to national laws. It is important for the 
G20 to continue to provide international momentum to combatting tax 
evasion and avoidance, but simply endorsing the progress to date by the 
OECD will not represent an outcome for which the Brisbane Summit will 
be remembered. 
The Prime Minister did highlight, in the context of discussing the 
challenges countries face in protecting the integrity of their national tax 
systems, that his hope “is to have a really frank leaders-only discussion 
in Brisbane about the biggest issues we face, including digitalisation and 
its implications for tax, trade and global integration”.12 One hopes that 
the Prime Minister follows through and turns his ‘hopes’ into action. Such 
a forward-looking discussion that focuses on the fact that firms are 
increasingly operating globally, that global value chains dominate world 
trade, and technological developments will continue to drive the 
integration of economies, would be a significant outcome from the 
Brisbane Summit. The implication from these developments would be 
the recognition that there are increasing numbers of areas that are 
beyond the control of nation states and that international cooperation is 
essential. This could represent an important refocusing of the role, 
priorities, and importance of the G20. 
 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Hockey, “Australia's Role in Strengthening International Consultation and 
Cooperation, Address to the Lowy Institute (6 February, 2014)”. 
12 Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, 
Switzerland (23 January, 2014)”. 
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THE FEBRUARY 2014 MEETING OF G20 FINANCE 
MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS 
The communique from the first meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors under the Australian chair was pleasingly short, 
just two pages – although there is still some way to go to achieve the 
brevity of former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, who as 
chair of the G20 finance minister meetings in 2009 insisted on one page 
communiqués. The main ‘outcome’ from the meeting was the so called 
‘growth target’, although there is no target. Specifically, the communiqué 
says “we will develop ambitious but realistic policies with the aim to lift 
our collective GDP by more than 2 per cent above the trajectory implied 
by current policies over the coming year”.13 
How significant is the ‘growth aim’? It will only be significant if it 
influences G20 countries to do things differently in the future and tackle 
some controversial domestic economic reforms. As noted by the IMF, 
growth gains come from ambitious national policies that each country 
needs to implement for its own good.14 The finance ministers’ 
communiqué says: “To achieve this we will take concrete actions across 
the G20, including to increase investment, lift employment and 
participation, enhance trade and promote competition, in addition to 
macroeconomic policies. These actions will form the basis of our 
comprehensive growth strategies and the Brisbane Action Plan”.15 
Of course, the G20 has been here before. The G20 Toronto Summit 
declaration refers to research by the IMF showing that if G20 members 
adopted more ambitious policies, global output could be increased by $4 
trillion, 52 million jobs could be created, and 90 million people could be 
lifted from poverty.16 In June 2010, G20 leaders committed to work 
together to achieve these outcomes.17 Such commitments to lift global 
growth and create jobs were made at subsequent summits, along with 
lengthy action plans that were meant to outline the specific policy 
measures each G20 member would take to achieve stronger global 
growth. Yet global growth continues to disappoint: the ambitious reforms 
were not adopted. 
                                                
13 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
14 IMF, OECD, and World Bank, “Macroeconomic and Reform Priorities - 
Prepared by IMF Staff with Inputs from the OECD and the World Bank,” 
(Sydney 2014). 
15 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014”. 
16 “The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration,” 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communique.html. 
17 Ibid. 
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Why will things be different in 2014? Treasurer Hockey said that the 
problem with the G20’s approach in the past was that “it did not go down 
to the next layer of detail and set clear practical goals”.18 He also said 
that “the Mutual Assessment process set up by the G20 did not provide 
enough top-down guidance to make sure our individual and collective 
actions were sufficiently well coordinated to maximise the impact on the 
global economy”.19 However, as noted, past G20 summits set many 
goals for growth and job creation, and the action plans were full of detail. 
The core of the problem is that G20 countries did not turn words into 
domestic policy action. And that is the key test, will the ‘growth aim’ 
endorsed at the Sydney finance ministers’ meeting see words turned into 
action? 
The reforms identified by the IMF and the OECD, which form the basis of 
the model simulations predicting that growth could rise by 2 per cent 
over five years, are politically difficult for all G20 members.20 For 
example, the reforms and outcomes for China include: reduce private 
saving, increase the cost of capital through the better pricing of risks and 
the liberalisation of interest rates, a shift to more productive investment, 
increased government transfers in order to improve social safety nets, 
and a “fully flexible exchange rate”.21 For Germany, reforms are required 
to: boost private investment, lift productivity by liberalising services 
markets and product markets, along with an increase in public 
investment equal to 0.5 per cent of GDP.22 The reforms assumed for the 
US also include a permanent increase in public investment, particularly 
infrastructure, and an increase in private saving of 0.6 per cent of GDP 
along with further fiscal consolidation.23  
An indication of the “ambitious but realistic” reforms24 that the 
international organisations are assuming for Australia can be gained 
from the OECD’s Going for Growth initiative. The top reforms identified 
for Australia include: boosting business-research collaboration, 
improving the efficiency of the tax system by lowering corporate taxes 
and relying more on the GST, improving the regulation of infrastructure 
by expanding user charges and congestion charges, improving childcare 
support in order to lift female participation, and reducing the stringency of 
                                                
18 Hockey, “Australia's G20 Agenda, Address to the Institute of International 
Finance (20 February, 2014)”. 
19 Ibid. 
20 IMF, OECD, and World Bank, “Macroeconomic and Reform Priorities - 
Prepared by IMF Staff with Inputs from the OECD and the World Bank.” 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Hockey, “Australia's G20 Agenda, Address to the Institute of International 
Finance (20 February, 2014)”. 
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the scrutiny of foreign investment.25 These are politically difficult but 
necessary reforms. 
The comprehensive growth strategies and the Brisbane Action Plan will 
have to cover the reforms identified by the IMF, OECD, and World Bank. 
If they do, it will mark a major change from previous G20 action plans, 
which largely identified the measures that countries were already 
implementing or had announced, and not the additional reforms needed 
to lift growth. But not only must the reforms be included in the Brisbane 
Action Plan, they also have to be implemented if growth is to be 
increased. However, countries will not announce major, controversial 
domestic economic reforms at an international meeting without first 
preparing the ground with their citizens. In short, if G20 members are 
going to take the ‘aim’ announced at the Sydney finance ministers 
meeting to lift growth by 2 per cent over five years, they will need to start 
engaging with their citizens over the required reforms well before the 
presentation of growth strategies at the Brisbane Summit. 
G20 ministers continue to endorse efforts to strengthen financial sector 
regulation, with the noble aim of ensuring that the reforms promote 
resilience, certainty and promote growth. But they also continue to 
provide no detail on achieving these objectives.  
At the February meeting regret was expressed over the failure to 
complete IMF quota and governance reforms and the US was urged to 
ratify the reforms by the next ministerial meeting in April. While the US 
Administration attempted to link the IMF reforms with the aid package for 
Ukraine, it appears that the US Congress was not listening to the G20 
and the IMF reforms were excluded from the legislation. This could turn 
into a very difficult issue for Australia as chair of the G20 if the emerging 
markets want to escalate their frustration at the failure to deliver 
commitments made by the G20 in 2010. 
 
COMMUNICATION 
Australia needs to improve the flow of information around the issues 
being progressed by the G20 in 2014. For example, many photos of the 
sherpas’ meetings are released, but minimal information is provided as 
to the issues being discussed. Far more background information was 
provided by Russia when it chaired the G20 in 2013. In particular, the 
Russian Sherpa and Finance Deputy regularly held press conferences 
that were widely reported.  
                                                
25 OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 2014: Going for Growth Interim Report 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014). 
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THE WAY FORWARD 
As noted, Australia is approaching the halfway point of its G20 
presidency. There has been a good start in many areas, but a lot of work 
remains and improvements are required if the Brisbane Summit is going 
to be a significant point on the international calendar. Perhaps the most 
important development required is for the prime minister to outline as 
soon as possible what will be the ‘few key areas’ on the leaders’ agenda 
and what he wants as the main outcomes from the Brisbane Summit. 
Importantly, Prime Minister Abbott needs to show that he is personally 
engaged and is active in engaging other G20 leaders well in advance of 
the summit. 
Importantly, Prime 
Minister Abbott needs to 
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AUSTRALIA’S G20 
 
BARRY CARIN1 
Centre for International Governance Innovation 
 
“The idea of a ‘magic bullet’ that will fix all performance management 
problems is an unrealistic aspiration” ~ Australian Public Service 
Commission.2 
In his January address at the World Economic Forum, Prime Minister 
Abbott highlighted trade, tax, infrastructure, employment and banking as 
the issues Australia will emphasise.3 While it is easy to scoff at the 
prospects for the Brisbane G20, recognition of Australian practicality 
leads to the conclusion that the G20 glass is more than half full. Sceptics 
point to the long list of complex issues on the agenda and the 
shortcomings of the G20 process inherited by Australia. Optimism, 
however, is soundly based on the Australian capacity for ingenuity and 
their national no-nonsense character. 
Optimists can take comfort from the history of Australian originality and 
cleverness. History tells us that Australians can build a better 
mousetrap.4 Examples of Australian inventiveness include the feature 
film, wifi, utes, and perhaps most significant, the wine cask. The 
resourceful use of leftover brewer’s yeast – Vegemite – is an Australian 
creation. The list of imaginative Australian products is impressive; it 
includes the Hills Hoist, insect repellent, Ugg boots, the notepad, 
software for animators, and the first commercial cochlear implant. The 
Brisbane G20 can produce concrete useful results despite the 
apparently over-constrained context. Hard-headed Australian leadership 
will likely lead to realistic and sensible outcomes. 
 
                                                
1 Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). 
2 Deborah Blackman et al., Strengthening the Performance Framework: 
Towards a High Performing Australian Public Service (Canberra: Australian 
Public Service Commission, 2013). 
3 Tony Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (23 January, 2014),” http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-
01-23/address-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland-0. 
4 Renee Krosch, “A Great Aussie Invents the Supeme Mousetrap Machine (7 
December, 2012),” 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2012/12/06/3649257.htm. 
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Among the constraints facing the Australian presidency is an imposing 
inherited agenda. Australia is not free to set priorities. The Saint 
Petersburg G20 requested many reports to be delivered to Brisbane – 
reports on growth strategies, country specific plans on employment, 
financing for investment, structure of the Financial Stability Board 
representation, Financial Action Task Force standards on ownerships 
and trusts, concrete outcomes on development priorities, and yet 
another report on inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies. This inherited agenda 
will absorb a lot of time and energy. But Australia must take these remits 
seriously to ensure that decisions at Brisbane are followed up by Turkey 
in 2015.  
The December 2013 “Overview of Australia’s Presidency” highlighted 
“promoting stronger economic growth and employment outcomes” and 
“Making the global economy more resilient to deal with future shocks” to 
lift growth, boost participation, create jobs and build the resilience of the 
global economy. The featured priorities to ‘shift the dial' on world growth 
were unobjectionable – attracting private infrastructure investment, 
removing obstacles to trade, creating jobs and lifting participation, 
empowering development, strengthening energy market resilience, and 
fighting corruption. 
The critics will harp on about the emphasis on the role of the private 
sector and growth led by business. As Treasury Hockey has stated: “the 
centrepiece of that [the Brisbane] agenda will be commitments from 
members to undertake domestic reforms that tangibly improve the 
investment environment and so unlock private sector investment, 
particularly in the area of infrastructure”.5 The arguments about the role 
of the public sector and the limitations of the profit motive are well 
known, so it will be interesting to see if Australia promotes some 
innovative initiatives to redirect private sector funding. In any case, we 
can look forward to some ingenious proposals to stimulate investment in 
infrastructure from pension funds and sovereign wealth funds.  
With respect to ‘empowering development’, few will argue with 
Australia’s stated priority for 2014 to link development actions to growth, 
by creating the conditions for developing countries to attract 
infrastructure investment, by strengthening tax systems, and by 
improving access to financial services. With respect to ‘strengthening 
energy market resilience’, mention is made of improving the operation 
and transparency of global energy markets, increasing cooperation 
between major producers and consumers, and advancing work on 
energy efficiency. Missing here is any new substantive initiative to 
                                                
5 Joe Hockey, “Australia's Role in Strengthening International Consultation 
and Cooperation, Address to the Lowy Institute (6 February, 2014),” 
http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/speech/001-2014/. 
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pursue international collaborative R&D efforts, à la the International 
Space Station. 
The preparatory process straitjacket is a serious constraint. Australia 
inherits an impracticable tradition – a number of working groups with 
reporting split between two tracks: the Sherpas and the ‘finance track’. 
The split does not make sense. Working groups and task forces include 
anti-corruption, investment and infrastructure, Framework, development, 
employment, and energy sustainability. In addition there will be meetings 
of trade ministers, and labour and employment ministers. Given the 
interconnections and spillovers between issues, coordination to provide 
coherence will be very challenging, especially since there is not one 
Australian official in charge. 
Figure 1: Constraints on a G20 host.  
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
While somewhat constrained in the ability to set additional priorities, 
Australia is doing many things right. In terms of process, the system of 
the G20 troika allows for institutional memory and continuity. Respect for 
the troika leads to Australian influence for a further year. By all accounts, 
Australia is substantively involving its troika colleagues. Outreach is 
extensive. It is wise to continue to resist calls to rescue the climate 
change negotiations. A successful outcome is unachievable in the 
The preparatory process 
straitjacket is a serious 
constraint. 
 THINK20 2014: A PROGRESS REPORT ON AUSTRALIA’S G20 PRESIDENCY 
 
17
 
current context; in any case, G20 intervention would not be welcomed by 
non-G20 countries. Australia is prudent to not raise expectations. 
Assessments to date by business and civil society are moderate.6 The 
International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) third instalment of their 
annual Scorecard notes that progress remains poor in several crucial 
areas, including energy and the environment, but overall rates G20 
responsiveness to business priorities as ‘fair’, with a score higher than 
the two earlier Scorecards. “But the positive overall trend also masked 
deficiencies in individual categories. Among the lows was the failure to 
recognize the importance of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), no movement on carbon pricing and a lack of 
discussions on a high-standard multilateral framework for international 
investment”.7 
Civil society expectations are not high. Nancy Alexander writing for New 
Rules for Global Finance rated the G20 on governance as 1.5 on a scale 
of 4 (1-poor; 2-moderate; 3-good; 4-excellent). Writing in the same 
publication, Nathan Coplin rates the G20’s impact at 2.1 on a scale of 4. 
One idea that Australia should perhaps promote was initially raised two 
years ago by Andrew Haldane.8 He noted that the financial sector “lags 
by a generation both products and information in the management of its 
network. Today’s financial chains mimic product supply chains of the 
1980s and the information chains of the 1990s. For global supply chains 
and the internet, their fortunes were transformed by a common 
language. This enabled them to become global in scale and scope and 
highly adaptive to new demands and technologies”. He referred to the 
introduction of the Global Data Synchronisation Network (GDSN) 
recording product descriptions in a consistent way globally. Similarly, a 
universal Internet Protocol was agreed – the common language Hyper-
Text Markup Language (HTML). Writing recently in the Financial Times, 
Tim Harford quoted Haldane, who noted that proposals to tag both 
banks and financial products with unique ‘barcodes’ would make it easier 
to assess risk exposures in the future. “The experience of global supply 
chains and the web tell us there is no technological constraint on real-
                                                
6 International Chamber of Commerce, “ICC Sees Progress on G20 Agenda, 
Opportunities Ahead (7 March, 2014),” 
http://iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ICC-sees-progress-on-G20-agenda,-
opportunities-ahead/; New Rules for Global Finance, “Global Financial 
Governance & Impact Report,” (Washington 2013). 
7 International Chamber of Commerce, “ICC Sees Progress on G20 Agenda, 
Opportunities Ahead (7 March, 2014)”. 
8 Robleh D Ali, Andrew Haldane, and Paul Nahai-Williamson, “Towards a 
Common Financial Language" (paper presented at the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) "Building a Global Legal Entity 
Identifier Framework” Symposium, New York, 14 March 2012). 
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time measurement and management of financial inventories by even the 
largest firms. Where Wal-Mart has led, Wall Street could follow”.9  
One common-sense approach that does not appeared to have been 
emphasised so far is ‘sun-setting’, establishing provisions to 
automatically terminate entities after a specified period of time unless 
expressly reauthorised. The G20 is a great opportunity to attempt to 
ensure that organisations, funds and even informal arrangements do not 
live forever, long past their effective days. For example, G20 working 
groups and task forces should be given an explicit dissolution date. One 
courageous approach would be to establish a G20 review process to 
assess existing institutions and arrangements on a rotating basis and 
make recommendations regarding a sunset date. Outdated entities 
would be identified for elimination or renovation. 
Prime Minister Abbott has reaffirmed that “freedom and small 
government rather than more regulation and higher taxes will serve us 
best for the next fifty years and beyond”.10 One can hope that this means 
that Australia will devise and promote smart regulation for global 
commons issues and problems that require international cooperation. As 
the Australian Public Service Commission has concluded: “pragmatism 
highlights the need for organisations to adopt practices that are ’fit for 
purpose’. These practices need to fit organisations’ contexts and 
capacities (including people and financial resources). It is important to be 
realistic about what is possible and probable”.11 
 
                                                
9 Tim Harford, “Let's Have Some Real-Time Economics,” Financial Times 
(2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/5f2d1334-a4ca-11e3-9313-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2xgUMZrum. 
10 Hockey, “Australia's Role in Strengthening International Consultation and 
Cooperation, Address to the Lowy Institute (6 February, 2014)”. 
11 Blackman et al., Strengthening the Performance Framework: Towards a 
High Performing Australian Public Service. 
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EVOLUTION OF THE G20 
MACROECONOMIC AGENDA 
DURING THE AUSTRALIAN 
PRESIDENCY  
 
SERGEY DROBYSHEVSKY AND PAVEL TRUNIN1 
RENEPA and Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy 
 
The priorities of the Australian presidency in G20 are determined by the 
post-crisis macroeconomic development of both the G20 countries and 
the global economy as a whole. It is important that the agenda of the 
Australian G20 presidency in 2014 logically draws on the initiatives of the 
Russian presidency. 
During the Australian presidency the priorities are the issues related to 
ensuring, first, solid economic growth and new jobs, and second, 
resilience of the economies. The key task of the G20 under the 
Australian presidency is to implement the 2013 Saint Petersburg Action 
Plan containing specific measures and arrangements to achieve 
balanced economic growth.  
It is essential to control the implementation of the measures agreed by 
leaders at the G20 summit in Saint Petersburg in order to achieve 
macroeconomic targets. The accelerated growth of the G20 economies 
will be promoted by adherence to the agreed strategy as well as 
implementation of additional measures to foster innovation, global trade 
turnover, the attractiveness of infrastructure projects, and new jobs. The 
measures forming the basis of the Brisbane Action Plan are supposed to 
contribute to achieving a benchmark that was set for the first time by the 
G20: to increase the GDP of the G20 economies in five years by more 
than 2 per cent or US $2 trillion in real terms compared to the current 
levels. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to raise the GDP growth rate 
of the G20 economies on average by 0.5 percentage points a year over 
the five years. In addition, given that the October forecast of the IMF is 
used as a starting point, we believe that targets should be adjusted to 
reflect updated estimates of the economic prospects of the global 
                                                
1 Sergey Drobyshevsky, Managing Director of G20 Expert Council, RANEPA, 
and Pavel Trunin, Head of Macroeconomics and Finance Division, Gaidar 
Institute for Economic Policy. 
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economy and of major developed and developing countries.2 Moreover, 
the set goal is rather vague and can be interpreted in different ways, 
although establishing a quantitative target for economic development is 
obviously a positive step.  
The Action Plan proposed by Australia includes the strategy of 
stimulating economic growth and the strategy of raising the global 
resilience. The strategy of stimulating economic growth is based on the 
need to stimulate investment in infrastructure projects, to remove trade 
barriers and restrictions, to create jobs and enhance employment, and to 
stimulate economic activity, including in developing countries that are not 
G20 members. We believe it is extremely important that Australia has 
made the interests of the private sector the cornerstone. Nonetheless, to 
attract long-term private investments in infrastructure projects (required 
in the amount of US $50 trillion, according to the OECD3), it is necessary 
to develop the public-private partnership mechanisms which are 
proposed by Australia as a way to stimulate investment activity. The 
engagement of multilateral development banks can also be considered 
reasonable, as their intermediary role will enable the most efficient 
transformation of savings from institutional sectors into investments. The 
mechanisms to raise the attractiveness of investments, especially in 
infrastructure projects, were actively discussed at the first joint meeting 
of G20 and B20 held on 21 February 2014. In our view, the cooperation 
among the G20 leaders and B20 representatives is exactly the format 
that could solve the problems inhibiting the growth of investment activity 
in the private sector. 
However, the issue of stimulating long-term investments cannot be 
solved separately from two current features of the global economy: the 
distribution pattern of capital among groups of countries, and 
international migration of tax bases and companies’ profits. There is a 
serious misbalance in the global economy due to the distribution of 
capital between advanced economies and developing countries. During 
the 2000s, the developing countries accumulated large stocks of capital, 
first in the form of investments in risk-free low-yield assets; but shifting 
those funds to real sector and infrastructure projects is restrained by the 
high risks of inefficient investment decisions. The advanced economies 
have very good experience and enough skills to increase the effect of 
investments for global economic growth, but they are still in a fiscal 
consolidation stance and experiencing a repressed development of the 
financial sector. We hope that during the Australian presidency the G20 
                                                
2 IMF, “World Economic Outlook October 2013: Transitions and Tensions,” 
(Washington DC, 2013). 
3 OECD, “The Role of Banks, Equity Markets and Institutional Investors in 
Long-Term Financing for Growth and Development: Report for G20 Leaders,” 
http://www.oecd.org/pensions/private-
pensions/G20reportLTFinancingForGrowthRussianPresidency2013.pdf. 
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countries will start the process of successful and productive cooperation 
between advanced and developing economies on the issue of how to 
use the accumulated capital for global economic growth. 
During the last year, many of the G20 countries succeeded in achieving 
fiscal sustainability and rebalancing their government budgets. Now it is 
the monetary authorities’ turn to exit from post-crisis policy. We believe 
that during the Australian presidency it is essential to provide specific 
measures and mechanisms that would allow not only to coordinate the 
sequence of actions of the monetary authorities, including the measures 
to tighten monetary policy, but also to assess their impact on key 
development indicators of the G20 economies. The main risks and 
challenges faced by the G20 countries are related to the need to 
gradually exit from the monetary stimulus programs that are actively 
used by monetary authorities in major developed countries. Serious 
concerns are related to the response of the global community, and first 
of all the major developed countries, to the cutback of quantitative easing 
programs initiated by the US Federal Reserve in December 2013. The 
economic developments of the first months of 2014, namely the 
depreciation of national currencies of developing countries and 
strengthened capital outflow from their financial markets, will adversely 
affect economic development indicators. 
In our view, the G20 countries should make every effort and introduce 
specific measures and mechanisms to prevent the aggravation of 
negative trends in the global economy in response to the inevitable 
reduction of monetary stimulus programs. These issues were actively 
discussed during Russia’s presidency and at the first G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting held in February 2014 in 
Sydney. At this meeting, the finance ministers confirmed the need for a 
carefully planned and as transparent as possible prudent monetary 
policy. In this regard, it is important to focus on the deflation that persists 
in developing countries. With the target of 2 per cent, consumer prices in 
the Eurozone in February – according to preliminary data – grew only by 
0.8 per cent at an annual rate, which corresponds to their January 
dynamics, even though it is the risk of deflation that made the ECB 
reduce the key interest rates once again in November 2013. Great 
Britain is also experiencing a slower growth in consumer prices with 1.9 
per cent growth at an annual rate in January, being minimal since 
November 2009. 
In order to achieve sustainable economic growth for both advanced and 
developing economies, adherence to evolving barrier-free international 
trade is urgently needed. The global value chains are currently the key 
form of international cooperation and should get a new impulse for 
further development. We hope the Brisbane Action Plan will properly 
address this issue, and that G20 countries will work on it. Special 
attention to trade and global value chains is also needed because of the 
apparent tendency to shift industrial production to the advanced 
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countries. The ongoing depreciation of national currencies of developing 
countries increases their competitiveness as global producers, but the 
risks of this policy tool are also high. 
Given the remaining macroeconomic imbalances, it is necessary to 
continue the implementation of structural reforms in both developed and 
developing countries in order to enhance the stability of the global 
economy. The strategy of raising global resilience proposed by Australia 
provides a platform for reforms in the global financial system, stronger 
taxation systems, reforms of global institutions, higher stability of the 
energy markets, and the fight against corruption.  
As for reforming the global institutions, we support the plans of Australia 
regarding the need for the United States to sign the 2010 agreement on 
IMF Quota and Governance Reform by April 2014 when the next G20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting will be held. If 
this occurs, we can hope to achieve an agreement under the 15th 
General Review of Quotas in January 2015.  
On the whole, we believe that implementation of the proposed measures 
will support the recovery growth in the G20 countries, raise the resilience 
of the global economy, stimulate investments in the private sector and its 
willingness to invest in long-term infrastructure projects. However, to 
achieve the set goals, it is necessary to provide specific actions and 
measures and outline the intermediary results so that in five years the 
G20 countries can reach the target production levels. 
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THE AUSTRALIAN 
PRESIDENCY AND THE G20’S 
GROWTH AGENDA: FOCUS 
ON THE VALUE ADDED 
 
KATHARINA GNATH AND CLAUDIA SCHMUCKER1 
Stiftung Neue Verantwortung and German Council on Foreign Relations 
 
In 2009, the G20 declared itself the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation. The world’s major economic powers come 
together to coordinate their economic and financial policies in order to 
create strong, balanced and sustainable growth. The group’s main role is 
to build political momentum and a shared understanding for international 
problems and policies in an informal and flexible setting.  
In order for the G20 to be effective, any G20 presidency’s agenda should 
have at least two aims: it should add value to member states’ individual 
economic and financial policies and it should be concise.  
1. The G20 is a gathering of politically and economically very powerful 
nations that together represent 85 per cent of the world economy, 
75 per cent of global trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population. 
However, in order to be more than the sum of its parts, the policy 
measures on the G20 agenda should add value rather than simply 
list individual national economic and financial initiatives that 
members would tackle individually anyhow. The G20 agenda should 
concentrate on issues that countries alone cannot solve.  
2. A brief and focused agenda gives policy-makers in the G20 the 
opportunity for in-depth discussions to achieve tangible results 
instead of rubber-stamping an array of disparate policy initiatives. A 
concise agenda also makes it easier to communicate clearly 
identifiable results to the public which is generally sceptical with 
regard to the G20’s effectiveness and legitimacy.  
The Australian Government so far has fared well on the second point, 
but there is room to improve the first goal over the course of the 
remaining presidency. 
                                                
1 Katharina Gnath, Fellow, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung and Claudia 
Schmucker, Head of Globalization and World Economy Program, German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). 
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STRENGTHENING THE MAP  
The Australian presidency has structured this year’s G20 agenda along 
two main goals: it wants to the lay the foundations for stronger economic 
growth and make the global economy more resilient. Both global 
economic growth and resilience are part of the G20’s core and are rightly 
at the centre of this year’s agenda.  
The goal of the Australian presidency to develop a comprehensive 
Brisbane Action Plan for growth over the course of the year is therefore 
welcome. Yet the outcome of the recent G20 ministerial meeting in 
Sydney points in the wrong direction. In February 2014, the G20 finance 
ministers and central bankers agreed to lift the collective GDP by more 
than two per cent over the next five years. The shift to an overall 
numerical growth target is meaningless as long as the goal does not 
come with a consistent strategy on how to achieve it and clear steps for 
action. The target may even prove counterproductive if it takes away 
energy from strengthening the existing Mutual Assessment Process 
(MAP) in the context of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and 
Balanced Growth. The MAP brings together policy-makers to discuss 
individual policy measures in a regular process. Over the course of its 
presidency, Australia should improve the process by strengthening its 
peer-review element and by paying more attention to the consistency of 
national measures. The G20 should concentrate on developing a 
consistent overall approach rather than simply listing individual 
members’ growth-enhancing policies.2 
 
FACILITATING DOHA 
In his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2014, 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott listed trade as one of the G20’s main policy 
priorities to enhance growth. The Australian presidency has announced 
it wants to focus the G20 trade discussions on ways to remove obstacles 
to trade and enhance countries’ ability to participate in global value 
chains. While the international trade system has been a regular item on 
the leaders’ G20 agenda, it is currently not clear what the actual goal 
and value added of the Australian presidency in the area of trade will be. 
G20 member states already committed at their last summit in Saint 
Petersburg (September 2013) to refrain from introducing new 
                                                
2 See also our previous contribution to the Think20: Joshua Busby, “The G20 
and Climate Change - Beyond Goal-Setting at Brisbane,” Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/busby_the_g20_and_climate_change_-
_beyond_goal-setting_at_brisbane.pdf.; also available online at 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/policy-ideas-brisbane-g20-summit-
reflections-think20-2014. 
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protectionist measures in trade or investment until the end of 2016. With 
regard to supporting domestic reforms to increase countries’ 
participation in global trade, so far, Australia seems to focus on collecting 
individual reform activities rather than searching for a collective response 
to a global challenge. 
The G20 could add value to the global trade agenda by focusing on 
steps to strengthen the multilateral trading system at the World Trade 
Organization instead. The WTO agreement in Bali in December 2013 
was a great success that breathed new life into the long-moribund Doha 
trading round. Yet the Bali package only contains a small portion of the 
original trade portfolio. The Australian Government could use its 
presidency to work towards a new consensus among its members on a 
number of critical points on the multilateral trade agenda. The G20 
includes all the important actors at the WTO that could then collectively 
help bring the Doha round to a successful conclusion. 
 
ENHANCING INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT  
Australia has kept the issue of infrastructure investment on this year’s 
growth agenda after the Russian presidency had added it in 2013. Prime 
Minister Abbott emphasised in Davos that there was a global 
“infrastructure deficit” and he committed to bringing policy-makers and 
financiers together at the G20 to increase long-term infrastructure 
financing.3 The G20 finance ministers pledged in Sydney to establish 
policy and regulatory frameworks to enhance long-term investment in 
infrastructure that allow market incentives and disciplines to better 
unfold. The focus of the G20 over the coming year will be on 
commitments from member states to undertake domestic reforms that 
improve the investment climate. So far, this seems to imply a simple 
collection of individual members’ actions. Yet similar to the overall 
growth target above, the commitment risks becoming an empty shell if 
member states do not agree on concrete policy steps that form part of an 
overall and consistent strategy in this area. 
So far, this year’s G20 presidency has taken many steps in the right 
direction. The agenda is concise and Australia is clearly committed to 
achieving tangible results. The aim of increasing global economic growth 
brings the G20 back to its economic roots. Growth is a pressing issue for 
the global agenda for which the G20 can clearly act as a steering 
committee to discuss and coordinate member states’ strategies. 
However in all individual measures – including the overall growth 
                                                
3 Tony Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (23 January, 2014),” http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-
01-23/address-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland-0. 
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framework as well as in trade and infrastructure investment – the specific 
value added that the G20 brings to the issue needs to be clarified and 
strengthened over the coming months to make Australia’s G20 
presidency a success. 
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ADDING ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND DEVELOPMENT TO THE 
BRISBANE SUMMIT AGENDA 
 
JOHN KIRTON1 
G20 Research Group 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As the G20 approaches the halfway mark of its preparations for the 
Brisbane Summit in November 2014, two issues remain absent from the 
Australian host’s priority list. These are accountability and development. 
These items have been core agenda items since the G20 summits’ start 
in 2008. Over their first eight summits, G20 leaders have steadily 
strengthened their focus and performance on both subjects, culminating 
in the production of the G20’s first self-prepared accountability report – 
done on the topic of development – for the most recent G20 summit held 
in Saint Petersburg in September 2013. Brisbane will be the last G20 
summit before the United Nations meets at the leaders’ level in 
September 2015 to mark the date for fulfilling the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and to launch a new set of successor goals 
for the years ahead. Brisbane will thus be the last chance for the G20 
leaders to provide the leadership and guidance needed for the UN to 
succeed in this formidable but compelling task. 
 
G20 DEVELOPMENT COMMITMENTS 
In putting development and accountability back on the G20’s central 
agenda for Brisbane, the Australian host can build on a firm foundation 
from the past. From the start of G20 summitry, leaders have made 90 
commitments on development, as follows: 4 at Washington in 2008, 6 at 
London in April 2009, 9 at Pittsburgh in September 2009, 8 at Toronto in 
June 2010, 22 at Seoul in November 2010, 18 at Cannes in November 
2011, 10 at Los Cabos in June 2012, and 13 at Saint Petersburg in 
September 2013. Together this has made development the fourth 
                                                
1 Co-director, G20 Research Group; Munk School of Global Affairs, University 
of Toronto; Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial 
Studies, Renmin University of China. 
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highest area for G20 commitments, exceeded only by macroeconomic 
policy at 293, financial regulation at 201, and international financial 
institutional reform at 100. More G20 summit commitments have come 
on development than on trade at 87. 
 
G20 DEVELOPMENT COMPLIANCE 
Moreover, the G20 delivers on development. G20 members have 
complied with these commitments to a high degree. In the 36 
development commitments assessed for compliance from 2008 to 2013 
(representing 47 per cent of the 77 made during that time and all those 
from the Seoul Summit), average compliance is a respectable 68 per 
cent. Compliance is led by the United Kingdom at 93 per cent, followed 
in turn by Germany at 87 per cent, the European Union at 83 per cent, 
Canada at 82 per cent, France at 80 per cent, and the United States and 
Australia at 78 per cent each. G20 development compliance has been 
on the rise, with the assessed priority development commitments made 
at the Los Cabos Summit being complied with at an average level of 89 
per cent. This compares with the score of only 57 per cent for the 
assessed development commitments at the London Summit in April 
2009. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN G20 DEVELOPMENT 
GOVERNANCE 
This general rise in G20 development commitments and compliance 
coincides with an increasing G20 effort to become more accountable for 
delivering the commitments it makes, and to comply in ways that achieve 
the intended results. This effort at self-assessment began with the 
creation of the Development Working Group at the Toronto Summit. It 
expanded with the publication of the St Petersburg Accountability Report 
on G20 Development Commitments just before the G20 summit in 
September 2013.2 Yet neither of these processes is as intense or 
influential as that performed by the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) 
and the Framework Working Group, which was given responsibility for 
development within the G20 system when they were created in 2009. It 
thus remains important to return development to the Framework and the 
MAP, as well as adding other independent accountability mechanisms to 
get the development job done. 
                                                
2 Russian Presidency of the G20, “St Petersburg Accountability Report on 
G20 Development Commitments (2013),” 
http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/saint-petersburg/St-Petersburg-
Accountability-Report-G20-Development-Commitments.pdf. 
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LOOKING AHEAD 
This task has taken on added importance with the cancellation of the G8 
summit in 2014. The G8 has had a distinguished record of advancing 
global governance on development, and of working with the UN in this 
regard. This was seen most recently at the G8’s 2010 Summit with its 
signature Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, for 
MDG’s 4 and 5. These two and other key MDGs remain unmet as the 
2015 deadline looms. Moreover, the process for devising a new set of 
post-2015 development goals promises to broaden the agenda and to 
give greater attention to the macroeconomic and financial issues long at 
the centre of G20 concern. To shape this agenda in an integrated and 
coherent way, the UN process, unfolding without the direct attention of 
several influential global leaders working together, needs the catalytic 
leadership of the G20 if is to design and deliver development for the 
global community as a whole. 
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PROSPECTS FOR BRISBANE 
 
STEPHEN PICKFORD1 
Chatham House 
 
Three months into the Australian G20 Presidency, the government has 
already set out fairly extensively its ambitions for the Brisbane Summit. 
Whether it will be able to realise those ambitions is an open question, 
however. Some of the signs are encouraging, others less so. 
The Prime Minister and Treasurer have made it clear that they want to 
set an agenda which focuses on a few key issues, and to boost the 
effectiveness of the G20 as a steering group for the global economy in 
good times as well as in crisis. 
The signs so far are that the government is determined to try and 
change the way the G20 operates. It wants to ensure that the G20 is 
focused on actions and outcomes, allows frank and robust discussions, 
and engages with countries and bodies outside the G20. Given the drift 
and loss of focus at G20 summits over recent years, this ambition is 
welcome. Australia will undoubtedly meet with resistance from other G20 
members, some of whom are happier for the G20 to remain as a talking 
shop. But on the evidence of the Sydney Finance Ministers’ and 
Governors’ meeting in February, the Presidency is prepared to take 
them on. Identifying a growth objective of boosting growth by 2 per cent 
(albeit an aim which is set for the medium term and is likely to be difficult 
to verify) sends a strong signal of intent. The challenge will be to get 
countries to sign up to national actions to deliver it. 
The February communiqué also makes a good start in concentrating on 
the key macro policies that will be crucial in the short term in determining 
whether the global recovery can continue: ensuring that ‘normalisation’ 
of monetary policy progresses at the appropriate speed, that the 
strengthening of fiscal balance sheets takes place ‘flexibly’, and that the 
private sector (which is currently cash-rich) is encouraged to invest. 
Australia also appears to have invested considerable capital in trying to 
get the MAP process to work more effectively. This is potentially a very 
powerful tool to challenge countries to set stretching and ambitious 
targets for national policies, to hold them to account for delivering on 
these policies, and to recognise the potentially damaging spillovers from 
national policies onto other countries. Making the process work more 
                                                
1 Senior Research Fellow, Chatham House. 
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effectively is a crucial part of delivering on the policy priorities for the 
G20. Doing so will require considerable skill and effort, but at the 
moment Australia seems to be prepared to put in that effort. 
It is less clear that Australia is living up to its objective of slimming down 
the G20 agenda, focusing on key objectives and prioritising efforts on 
them. The avowed intention is to concentrate on only two policy areas: 
boosting growth and employment, and strengthening resilience of the 
global economy. But on the basis of public speeches so far, underlying 
these two objectives are at least six major priority policies. 
On boosting growth, Australia has identified: 
• Opening up trade 
• Encouraging investment, especially in infrastructure 
• Underpinning this by action to restore fiscal balance sheets. 
 
And to strengthen resilience, work is planned on: 
• Completing financial sector reforms 
• Getting international agreement on fair tax structures 
• Restarting IMF reform. 
Most of these are very challenging. Some of them rely heavily on 
national actions – putting in place an investment-friendly climate is a very 
country-specific issue; countries start from very different positions on 
fiscal policy, and so it will be difficult to coordinate fiscal actions; and 
progress on IMF reform can only move forward when the United States 
ratifies the 2010 agreement. 
In addition, two of the three areas where international agreement is 
crucial – trade and tax – are notoriously difficult to make progress on. 
The third – financial sector reform – is easier, because over the last five 
years the FSB has done most of the preparatory work to put right the 
failings which contributed massively to the crisis.  
But the WTO seems incapable of making progress on truly multilateral 
trade liberalisation, so that any forward movement on trade is likely to 
have to concentrate on plurilateral structures (all of which at the moment 
appear to exclude one of the most important trading nations, China). 
And, for all its good analytical work, the OECD does not appear to have 
the political clout to get full international agreement to the harmonisation 
of tax policies and practices, including by countries which are not 
members of the OECD. 
 
Making the process work 
more effectively is a 
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Finally, the experience of the previous attempt at IMF quota and 
governance reform (which despite the economic and financial crisis still 
took at least two years to finalise agreement on) suggests that the aim of 
completing the next round of reforms by January 2015 is extremely 
ambitious, and unlikely to be realised. 
Australia is to be commended for taking on these challenges, all of which 
are important elements of a better global financial order. And Australia’s 
position as a reasonably honest broker means that it can push hard on 
all these areas. It is also to be commended for not adding overly to the 
already overburdened G20 agenda, and for putting less priority on some 
areas. However, it will have to continue to resist pressure from other 
G20 countries to add further priorities which were added under previous 
presidencies. For example, the development agenda, anti-corruption 
measures, jobs and labour market participation and energy markets all 
feature in the official agenda for Australia’s presidency. Taking forward 
nine or ten separate (and difficult) agendas with equal vigour is bound to 
distract from the main priorities. 
Unless Australia can concentrate its efforts and negotiating capital more 
tightly, it runs the risk of disappointment and under-achievement. It will 
need to prioritise more tightly, so that it can use the opportunity 
presented by the G20 Leaders’ meeting in Brisbane to broker 
agreements on one or two key issues which can only be delivered by 
heads of the G20 governments. 
Unless Australia can 
concentrate its efforts 
and negotiating capital 
more tightly, it runs the 
risk of disappointment 
and under-achievement.
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MEXICO’S ASSESSMENT AS 
TO HOW THE G20 PROCESS 
IS PROGRESSING THIS YEAR 
UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN 
PRESIDENCY 
 
ANDRÉS ROZENTAL1 
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations 
 
The Australian presidency focus emphasising economic growth and job 
creation, together with improving the G20’s working methods, is, in our 
view, welcome, and has led to a simplification of this year’s agenda and 
the identification of concrete deliverables in preparing for the Brisbane 
Summit next November. 
 
COMMENTS ON THE FINANCE STREAM 
Mexico is by and large satisfied with the results of the meeting of 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors that was held in Sydney 
on 22-23 February, especially the commitment to boost global economic 
growth by 2 per cent over the next five years, above and beyond current 
trends. The Working Group on a vigorous, sustained and balanced 
growth framework needs to develop integrated growth strategies that 
include commitments not only on fiscal and monetary policy, but also on 
employment, trade, the fight against corruption, and energy. Mexico’s 
achievements in passing a very ambitious reform agenda in the energy, 
education, labour, finance and telecoms sectors, to name just a few, 
should be recognised in the Brisbane Action Plan. 
The G20 should continue to urgently press the United States to ratify the 
IMF’s quota and governance reforms as soon as possible. This would 
allow emerging countries like Mexico to assume a larger role in the 
Fund’s decision-making process. Mexico, together with Indonesia and 
Germany, co-chair the Infrastructure Investment Working Group, which 
has the potential to encourage private investment in the sector in order 
to give a further boost to economic growth. 
 
                                                
1 Member ex oficio, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (Comex). 
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COMMENTS ON THE SHERPA STREAM 
During the first Sherpa meeting in Uluru on 27-28 March 2014 some of 
the more important deliverables for the Brisbane Summit were identified. 
Agreement was reached to discuss the G20’s role in international 
economic governance. 
Mexico’s priority is for the G20 to consider the social consequences of 
the global economic crisis, especially in employment, vulnerable sectors 
of the population, as well as in food security and financial inclusion. 
Mexico also feels that there should be a better balance in the G20’s 
agenda in favour of developing countries. The Australian decision not to 
include food security as a priority issue in the Development Working 
Group is, in Mexico’s view, unfortunate. Employment also needs to be 
kept as a priority issue in the G20’s agenda. We agree with the 
Australian presidency’s desire to incorporate gender equality in the 
discussion of this issue. Regarding energy and environment, we strongly 
regret Australia’s decision not to reiterate traditional G20 support for the 
UN climate change negotiations.  
Mexico supports the outreach process undertaken by the Australian 
presidency vis-à-vis non G20 members, as well as regional and 
subregional international organisations. We also support the continuation 
of parallel fora such as the Business20, Labour20, Think20, Youth20 
and Civil20 as a way of enriching the agenda’s discussions by 
incorporating non-state actors’ views.  
 
FINAL COMMENT 
Mexico has a vested interest in keeping the G20 alive and relevant 
beyond the current financial crisis. Therefore, consideration should be 
given during the Australian presidency to making sure that the G20’s 
agenda is not circumscribed to issues purely related to the crisis, but 
also looks beyond to a time when the Group can act as a global steering 
committee for other issues currently unresolved elsewhere in the 
international institutional framework. 
 THINK20 2014: A PROGRESS REPORT ON AUSTRALIA’S G20 PRESIDENCY 
 
35
 
2014 AUSTRALIAN 
PRESIDENCY OF THE G20: 
TOWARDS AN AGENDA OF 
RENEWED COOPERATION? 
 
GUVEN SAK1 
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey 
 
The lingering effects of the global financial crisis reflected in the slow 
pace of economic recovery have made the need for deeper and stronger 
global macroeconomic coordination more urgent. Without doubt, 
governments around the world are hoping for a new wave of 
collaboration to boost global growth and productivity through the 
promotion of international trade, investment, and job growth. The G20 
has both the capacity and the political legitimacy to design reforms to 
meet these expectations and in doing so facilitate the advancement of 
global economic wellbeing, which is the platform’s raison d’être. With 
Australia assuming the G20 presidency in 2014, a new opportunity to 
boost the G20’s image as the primary driver of global economic 
cooperation has emerged.  
We welcome the Australian Government’s declared commitment to 
promote more effective global governance as the 2014 G20 chair. The 
Brisbane Summit aims to focus on a narrow but inclusive agenda. The 
focused and inclusive framework provides an important opportunity to 
tackle economic issues more rigorously and adequately. For these 
reasons, we believe that Australia’s 2014 agenda for the G20 offers a 
much-needed perspective to effectively prioritise and address specific 
issues instead of general and abstract objectives. 
Australia’s positive kick-off notwithstanding, we would also like to 
emphasise that the momentum for cooperation among G20 countries 
needs to be maintained. One of the reasons for the sluggish growth is 
that economic and political actors around the world are not fully aware or 
acknowledging of the paramount importance of collective inter-state 
action. 
 
                                                
1 Managing Director, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey 
(TEPAV). 
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In 2008, the G20 declared its commitment to international cooperation 
for achieving and sustaining global growth. At that time, the G20 platform 
was strong enough to take joint decisions and G20 countries decisively 
adopted these decisions. Moreover, the central banks of the G20 
countries decided to monetise jointly in order to revitalise the global 
economy in 2009. However, the faster recovery of the American 
economy compared to global markets and the subsequent decision of 
the Federal Reserve (Fed) to initiate tapering policies have weakened, 
and in some cases reversed, the gains brought about by the 
harmonisation efforts taken under the G20 umbrella in 2009. Along with 
other critics of the Fed’s tapering policy we interpret the policy decision 
as a sign of disingenuity whereby developed countries, once they have 
recovered from the crisis, abandon emerging markets in the quagmire of 
sluggish growth. In view of the fact that in 2009 the G20 took a joint 
decision to monetise, we believe that G20 countries should have been 
consulted before the Fed made its decision to reduce quantitative 
easing. 
Without doubt, such unilateral actions weaken collaboration among G20 
countries and damage the international credibility of the G20 at a time 
when global markets need joint decisions and actions more than ever. 
The G20 is in urgent need of a coordinated strategy in order to raise 
global awareness on the importance of collective decision-making and 
collective action. We hope that the Australian chair will proactively 
contribute to this crucial objective by underlining the need for 
cooperation among G20 countries, most importantly, between developed 
and emerging markets. 
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THE THREATS OF 
TRANSITION AND THE NEED 
TO SPEED UP THE BUILDING 
OF A ROBUST MARKET 
INFRASTRUCTURE: AN 
UPDATE 
 
JOSÉ SIABA SERRATE1 
Argentine Council for Foreign Relations 
 
Since the Think20 meeting held in December, the road to economic 
policy normalisation has proceeded according to plan with the very much 
debated ‘tapering’ of the third round of quantitative easing as the 
centerpiece of the new course of action set by the US Federal Reserve 
(FED), and a smooth reception in the marketplace.  
Economic optimism has gained traction, paving the road to expectations 
of more stimulus unwinding in the near future (especially in the United 
States). Both the IMF’s and the World Bank’s economic projections point 
towards improving GDP and trade activity in 2014-2015, though growth 
will still remain below potential, and lagging labour market conditions are 
not predicted to reach full employment levels in any short-term scenario, 
not even in the most benign one.2  
Noise has emerged from an unexpected front: the crisis of Ukraine has 
reignited geopolitical stress at levels not observed since the Cold War 
era. Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a sudden stop for the G8 
endeavour and brings the old East-West type of conflict back to the table 
in Europe. It reminds us that cooperation is a by-product of common 
                                                
1 Member, Argentine Council for Foreign Relations (CARI). 
2 IMF, “Is the Tide Rising? (21 January, 2014),” 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/update/01/pdf/0114.pdf; World 
Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Coping with Policy Normalization in High-
Income Countries, vol. 8 (Washington DC, 2014); International Labor 
Organization, “Global Employment Trends 2014: The Risk of a Jobless 
Recovery,” http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_233953.pdf.; Alfredo Gutiérrez Girault and 
José Siaba Serrate, The G20’s Agenda and the Challenge of Transition 
(December, 2013)” [“La Agenda del G20 y el Desafío de la Transición”], 
CARI-Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.  
THINK20 2014: A PROGRESS REPORT ON AUSTRALIA’S G20 PRESIDENCY 
 
38
 
understanding and joint efforts among nations more than an iron fate 
dictated by the rules of globalisation. National interests and political will 
must first align in the international arena to foster globalisation. And 
unfortunately they cannot be always taken for granted.  
 
WHILE GROWTH IS SLOW, DISINFLATION IS THE 
NORM 
Despite prolonged unconventional stimulus, inflation has not turned into 
a problem. And in fact it persists well below central banks’ official 
targets.3 Mild disinflation has been the norm since 2010 though deflation 
risks are deemed to be low. G7 authorities tend to believe that inflation 
rates will gradually converge to their targets in a natural self-attaining 
way, but, as time passes, there are no signs this is starting to happen.4 
However, monetary policy is not specifically addressing the issue (the 
Bank of Japan being the only exception).5 Although Mario Draghi, the 
head of the European Central Bank (ECB), has warned of the risks of 
“too low inflation”6 and has mentioned several measures under study 
(such as the imposition of negative interest rates), none of them have 
been implemented (nor are they seriously expected to be), even though 
Eurozone inflation rates are less than half the ECB target.7 In the last 
                                                
3 At the time of editing, consumer price index inflation is below central bank 
targets in the US, the Eurozone, Japan, Canada, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and South Korea. Great Britain is the last member to join this 
disinflation club. Source: José Siaba Serrate, “Disinflation, the global spectre” 
[“La desinflación, el fantasma global”], Ambito Financiero, 20 February, 2014. 
4 “Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster 
maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with 
appropriate policy accommodation, economic activity will expand at a 
moderate pace and labor market conditions will continue to improve gradually, 
moving toward those the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. 
The Committee sees the risks to the outlook for the economy and the labor 
market as nearly balanced. The Committee recognizes that inflation 
persistently below its 2 percent objective could pose risks to economic 
performance, and it is monitoring inflation developments carefully for evidence 
that inflation will move back toward its objective over the medium term.” Quote 
sourced from: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Press 
Release (19 March, 2014),” 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140319a.htm. 
5 José Siaba Serrate, “Between Deflation and the Rising Sun” [“Entre la 
Deflación y el Sol Naciente”], Debate May 2013. 
6 Fergal O'Brien, “Draghi Says ECB Forward Guidance May Help to Curb 
Euro,” Bloomberg News (2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-
13/draghi-says-ecb-guidance-may-help-to-curb-euro-strength-1-.html. 
7 Szu Ping Chan, “ECB Ready to Enter Uncharted Waters as Bank Cuts 
Interest Rate to Fresh Low of 0.5pc,” The Telegraph(2013), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10034109/ECB-ready-to-enter-
uncharted-waters-as-bank-cuts-interest-rate-to-fresh-low-of-0.5pc.html; “Jens 
Widmann: QE Not 'out of the Question',” (2014), 
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FED meeting (18-19 March 2014) the lone dissenter, Narayana 
Kocherlakota, cited that (a) “the new (forward) guidance weakens the 
credibility of the Committee’s commitment to target 2 percent inflation”.8 
Kocherlakota argues that (b) “the new guidance fosters policy 
uncertainty and thereby suppresses economic activity”.9  
While growth picks up in advanced economies (including its resumption 
in the Eurozone), it is decelerating in emerging markets. Both 
phenomena are not independent but connected by financial transmission 
links. A stronger US economy leads to actual and expected shifts in US 
monetary policy with widespread effects in international financial 
markets. Portfolio outflows hit emerging markets hard, provoking sharp 
bouts of turbulence, both in mid-2013 and in late January/early February 
2014. With currencies and asset markets under pressure, local officials 
in emerging countries had to react by tightening their own policies in 
order to ensure stability. Flexible nominal exchange rates and foreign 
exchange reserve intervention helped mitigate the blow. Countries with 
external deficits were especially targeted. As national spending cuts help 
restore the external accounts, a geographical extension of 
Kocherlakota’s critique (b) is granted: uncertainty suppresses economic 
activity well beyond the US borders. And – as a by-product – it could 
also trigger more disinflation headwinds globally.  
In their 22-23 February 2014 meeting in Sydney, G20 finance ministers 
and central bank governors tackled this issue when they recognised 
there is policy space to promote stronger economic growth. They agreed 
to “develop ambitious but realistic policies with the aim to lift our 
collective GDP by more than 2 per cent above the trajectory implied by 
current policies over the coming 5 years”.10 Such commitments should 
be carefully crafted to avoid aggravating emerging markets’ woes 
through G7 policy changes and negative spillovers. 
 
THE TAPERING SAGA: ANTICIPATION IS KEY 
In terms of financial stress, given heavy discounting by capital markets, 
the ‘tapering’ saga proved to be more corrosive during its announcement 
                                                                                                       
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10722221/Jens-Weidmann-
QE-not-out-of-the-question.html.  
8 Narayana Kocherlakota, “Statement on Dissenting Vote at March 19, 2014, 
Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (21 March, 2014),” 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=528
1&. 
9 Ibid. 
10 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
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phase (last year) that when its gradual execution became effective (in 
January). Such experience brought a valuable lesson. In a volatile world, 
where you have to expect the unexpected, it is then – when all of a 
sudden the unexpected arises – that you might face the strongest shock. 
Considering that tapering is not even a reversal of monetary base 
creation (just a deceleration) it is easy to understand that tougher 
challenges lie farther down the road. 
It took time for the FED’s ‘tapering is not tightening’ mantra to take hold. 
Former FED chairman Ben Bernanke emphasised the point since day 
one, when he issued the first tapering warning in May 2013. Indeed, 
tapering talk tightened financial conditions at least until September 2013 
as investors reacted by aggressively curtailing duration risk until they 
rebalanced their portfolios. For emerging markets, tapering in the United 
States was tightening at home. And tapering-related flows are still a 
significant headwind and remain an open potential menace.  
 
THE COMMUNICATION CHALLENGE 
Tightening monetary base creation is unambiguously the next step in the 
agenda. Lifting G7 short-term interest rates will be the cornerstone of the 
normalisation drive. Leaving zero rate policies and resetting rates at their 
long-term equilibrium levels will take several years and require extremely 
careful handling. Such highly likely processes cannot be called an 
‘unexpected event’, even though its precise steps and timing are 
uncertain.  
Communication has a key role in helping to bridge the uncertainty gap. 
G20 finance ministers in their February 2014 meeting committed to 
“consistently communicate our actions to each other and the public” and 
“continue to cooperate on managing spillovers to other countries” as well 
as “to ensure the continued effectiveness of global safety nets”.11 Pre-
emptive communication might help to achieve those three very important 
goals simultaneously. But no matter how well designed the 
communication effort, there are limits to what can be told. Transparency 
is not a synonym of predictability, either. There are limits to what can be 
done as authorities might not know their conditional future decisions well 
in advance. Perfect foresight is not a merchandise to be found on the 
shelf. 
Use of forward guidance by central banks is the right type of information 
tool but their guiding function had to be redrafted this year both in the 
United States and in Great Britain. The FED abandoned its quantitative 
economic guidance in its March meeting and replaced it with a vaguer, 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
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less precise qualitative guidance that eliminated any numerical reference 
by dropping both the 6.5 per cent unemployment rate and the 2.5 per 
cent inflation rate thresholds. Fortunately, the FED’s Summary of 
Economic Projections was retained and the most likely path of rising 
rates can still be estimated.12 The first FED funds rate raise is not 
expected until next year. They might reach 1 per cent by the end of 2015 
and 2.25 per cent by December 2016 according to Federal Open Market 
Committee insiders’ median estimates. 
 
THE NEED FOR SOLID FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
At the end of the day, policy will be conditional on the economy and 
financial markets, and surprises cannot be ruled out. Initial conditions do 
matter and they are skewed towards extreme relaxation. Asymmetries 
exist. While yield compression might be benign, reversals tend not to be 
and they demand slow administration. Random shocks occur. That is 
why the installation of a solid financial infrastructure ought to be 
considered a growing priority for policy-makers (as well as for regulators 
and supervisors). Ample loss absorption capabilities are needed (both in 
financial intermediaries and in capital markets) to weather unexpected 
storms so as to keep damage under control without economic disruption 
or serious social spillovers. 
In that department, 2014 has seen progress in the United States, Europe 
and China. The US FED finished their Annual Comprehensive Capital 
Analysis and Review for financial intermediaries with 29 out of 30 
institutions cleared at the stress exams.13 Coverage was increased with 
12 more banks participating than in 2013. The tests included 28 
variables under analysis. Those variables are selected with a very wide 
scope in mind. Twelve of them were of international nature. All 
institutions but one were able to run through the most adverse scenario 
while keeping at least a 5 per cent capital tier 1 relation to their assets. In 
that extreme scenario banks faced a simultaneous 50 per cent drop in 
equity prices and a 25 per cent fall in housing prices as well as a jump in 
the unemployment rate to 11.25 per cent (currently at 6.7 per cent). 
 
                                                
12 Dallas FED President Richard Fisher defended the “sloppier” new guidance 
as it should be “less vulnerable to any errors officials make in their forecasts”. 
Source: Dow Jones Business News, “Fed's Fisher: 'Sloppier' New Guidance 
Has Advantages,” Nasdaq (2014), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/feds-fisher-
sloppier-new-guidance-has-advantages-20140321-00560. 
13 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Dodd-Frank Act 
Stress Test 2014: Supervisory Stress Test Methodology and Results,” 
(Washington DC, 2014). 
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In Europe, the ECB will assume oversight of the largest banks in the 
Eurozone in November 2014 in what will be the first step in the banking 
union roadmap. Approximately 128 institutions will be under their direct 
supervision. Control of smaller banks will remain the job of national 
supervisory agencies. The ECB has already published the general 
guidelines of their stress tests. Defining common standards was a very 
demanding task considering that banks under scrutiny operate in 18 
different legal frameworks. The central bank will first assess the asset 
quality of banks’ portfolios (reviewing all types of risks, including, unlike 
in the past, sovereign risks) and then it will measure banks’ resilience to 
extreme adverse conditions.14 The ECB stress tests are expected to 
correct past experiences when several institutions passed the European 
Banking Authority exams but were later unable to navigate the crisis 
without urgent injections of extraordinary official assistance. Trust in 
European banks is the prize expected to be gained with this revamped 
regime. It should be kept in mind that how Europe deals with 
undercapitalised institutions is a very strong pending issue. If 
mishandled, it could turn out to be a powerful source of financial 
instability. 
In China, financial reform is gaining ground pari passu with a huge credit 
clean-up process.15 The course is set for further liberalisation, but to 
succeed, legacy excesses should be corrected. Considering that China 
is also switching its economic model – from an export growth approach 
to a more inward-looking regime with a bigger role for private sector 
consumption and services – the challenge faced by policy-makers is 
massive. Past disorderly credit expansion, the surge of a huge shadow 
financial system, local government and state-owned enterprise debt 
increases, and leveraged real estate bets must all be dissected and put 
under control. In parallel, the liberalisation drive gives markets a strong 
say in interest rate deregulation, permission to open new private sector 
banks and even the first national corporate bankruptcies were allowed. 
Default jitters might hurt depositors’ confidence in local banks as there is 
no deposit insurance. Abandoning the old financial repression system is 
badly needed, but were China not in a very strong macroeconomic and 
net worth position and were capital controls not in place, the pace of 
financial transformation would be deemed very risky. Given China’s links 
with emerging markets its reform performance will reverberate in those 
markets strongly. 
 
                                                
14 ECB, “SSM Quarterly Report 2014/1 - Progress in the operational 
implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation”, 2 February 
2014. 
15 “José Siaba Serrate, “China ties its future to the key role of the market” 
[“China ata su futuro al rol clave del mercado”], Debate, December 2013. 
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In emerging markets, tapering-related turbulence has worked as a series 
of empiric stress tests for the local financial systems and policy 
frameworks.16 Up until now, they have responded without exposing 
significant flaws. Stability preservation demanded flexibility and 
economic policies were able to adapt successfully and to provide the 
right manoeuvring. 
Experience teaches that ceteris paribus countries with big financial 
systems are shaken the most.17 Financial integration is a mixed blessing. 
Not surprisingly, frontier markets were less affected than bigger 
emerging markets. Openness can be a double-edged sword because, 
relative to advanced markets, emerging markets are quite small and 
external shocks coming from advanced markets might be too big to 
swallow.  
Certainly, emerging markets will benefit if the international infrastructure 
improves. The 2010 IMF reforms were designed to provide a boost to 
channels of financing available to countries in conditions of hardship. 
But, four years later, neither the IMF quota review nor the governance 
reform have become effective. The US Congress has not cleared their 
way and there is no further progress. G20 finance ministers in Sydney 
urged “the US to do so before our next meeting in April” but the US 
political process has other priorities to take care of.18  
Without an international lender of last resort, and no access to huge 
pools of liquidity when needed the most, incentives to implement 
second-best defensive solutions are plentiful – going from increased 
foreign currency reserves accumulation to widespread utilisation of 
capital controls. Nonetheless, the international arena remains 
remarkably open to financial flows and has not been significantly 
affected by imposition of new distortions on the capital accounts. 
 
                                                
16 Alfredo Gutiérrez Girault and José Siaba Serrate, “The G20’s Agenda” [“La 
Agenda del G20”]. 
17 Poonam Gupta and Barry Eichengreen, “Tapering Talk: The Impact of 
Expectations of Reduced Federal Reserve Security Purchases on Emerging 
Markets (16 December, 2013),” 
https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/tapering-talk-impact-
expectations-reduced-federal-reserve-security-purchases-emerging-markets. 
18 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014”. 
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AN EFFICIENT APPROACH TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE G20 
 
REI TANG1 
The Stanley Foundation 
 
In the Think20 meeting in December 2013, several voices spoke about 
the need for the G20 to take a leading role on climate change. Since the 
2009 Pittsburgh Summit, the G20 has made commitments to phase out 
fossil-fuel subsidies, phase down hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) through 
the Montreal Protocol, and stimulate climate finance.2 
While Australia has been quiet about climate change this year, other 
G20 members will want these items on the agenda. Along with an 
emphasis on energy efficiency – the Energy Sustainability Working 
Group (ESWG) focused on this issue in February 2014 – there may be 
advancement yet for climate change.3 Acting on vehicle fuel economy 
and emissions is an option for energy efficiency, for example. With the 
modest space given to climate change this year by Australia, efforts to 
advance the climate agenda will need to be practical. The pace and 
scope for climate items on the G20 agenda are different and need to be 
treated as such. 
In terms of fossil-fuel subsidies, the phase-out of these has gone through 
several studies and reviews as a part of the G20 agenda since 2009. 
Even though countries have taken measures, progress remains slow. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates fossil-fuel subsidies 
increased worldwide to $544 billion in 2012.4 Expectations need to be 
managed given this fact. There are also strong domestic political 
sensitivities, as seen in Indonesia which had to roll back subsidy reform 
in the face of public backlash. In the 2013 Saint Petersburg Summit, the 
                                                
1 Associate Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation. 
2 For a comparison between G20 actions on fossil-fuel subsidies phase-out 
and HFCs phase-down, see Joshua Busby, “The G20 and Climate Change - 
Beyond Goal-Setting at Brisbane,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/busby_the_g20_and_climate_change_-
_beyond_goal-setting_at_brisbane.pdf. 
3 Australian G20 Presidency, “Energy Efficiency a Focus for the G20 Energy 
Sustainability Working Group,” 
https://www.g20.org/news/energy_efficiency_focus_g20_energy_sustainability
_working_group. 
4 International Energy Agency, “Energy Subsidies (2013),” 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/. 
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G20 announced its intention to put in place a peer review system on 
fossil-fuel subsidies phase-out. The United States and China pledged to 
volunteer for this process in the 2013 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
(S&ED), which gives substantial backing to continued reinforcement of 
fossil-fuel subsidies phase-out in the G20. 
HFC phase-down is more of a near-term effort and can prove to be a 
quick win. The current commitment by the G20 is to open negotiations 
for adding HFCs to the Montreal Protocol in November 2014, right before 
the Brisbane Summit. While HFCs are not an ozone-depleting 
substance, the use of HFCs is the result of replacing 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (which replaced chlorofluorocarbons), a 
substance the Montreal Protocol is currently phasing down. It is within 
the scope of the Montreal Protocol to address substances that cause 
climate change as a result of it phasing out an ozone-depleting 
substance. Political support for this effort has been building among 
states for several years. The 2013 US-China S&ED also enabled the 
entry of HFC phase-down into the G20 agenda.  
If the Meeting of Parties (MOP) of the Montreal Protocol results in formal 
negotiations to include HFCs, the G20 will be proof that the major 
economies can work together on climate change. This would add sorely 
needed optimism in international climate change diplomacy preceding 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) meeting in 2015, a milestone conference where a follow-on 
agreement to the Kyoto Protocol will be negotiated.  
In 2013, countries had less than three months – from the Saint 
Petersburg Summit in September to the Montreal Protocol MOP in 
November – to manoeuvre to open negotiations on HFCs. With a longer 
period to prepare in 2014, G20 countries have a timing advantage to 
move forward on the issue and, if the MOP is successful, portray 
themselves as climate change leaders and support efforts in the 
Montreal Protocol and elsewhere. By linking its political agreements with 
regimes that have greater enforcement capability, the G20 will ensure its 
relevance as a ‘global steering committee’. 
Climate finance has not fared as well in the G20. Despite a 2011 report 
compiled by the World Bank and other international financial institutions 
and a brief progress report in 2012, the G20 has not taken up any 
climate finance policy initiatives – save for a working group on climate 
finance. While there does not seem to be space for any new initiatives 
this year, the G20 can provide a timely expression of support for the 
Green Climate Fund and the UNFCCC. As the G20 prioritises 
infrastructure investments, there may also be an opportunity to seek co-
benefits with climate change policy. 
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The concept paper on the 2014 G20 issued by Australia mentions that it 
will “explore how it can advance work on energy efficiency”.5 A 
description of the February 2014 ESWG meeting states: “Members 
acknowledged the importance of energy efficiency and agreed to share 
national energy efficiency experience and best practice with a view to 
further improving the uptake of energy efficiency practices and 
technologies in G20 economies”.6  
Indeed, the benefits of improved efficiency are many: ‘pocketbook’ 
savings for household budgets, industrial productivity gains, and 
increased asset values, for example. From a climate perspective, it is a 
huge opportunity for greenhouse gas reductions. For climate change, 
analysis from the IEA identifies efficiency as one of four policy areas that 
can keep the 2 degree target alive: “Targeted energy efficiency 
measures would reduce global energy-related emissions by 1.0 Gt in 
2020, a level close to that of Russia today”.7 
About 10 per cent of emission reductions from energy efficiency in the 
IEA scenario come from road transportation. With nearly all the major 
markets for passenger and heavy-duty vehicles being in G20 countries, 
one option the G20 could pursue – presented at the Think20 meeting in 
December 2013 – is a collective commitment on fuel economy and 
emissions standards.8 This could also achieve co-benefits on air quality, 
now that many emerging economies are faced with more people buying 
vehicles. Adapted from a February 2014 memo on motor vehicle air 
quality regulations in G20 nations, actions could include: 
• For light-duty vehicles, adopt Euro 6/VI vehicle emission standards 
by or before 2020. Efficiency standards under best practices with 
sufficiently long regulatory lead-time can cost-effectively achieve 4-
6% per-year reductions in per-vehicle CO2 emissions, with fuel 
savings that greatly outweigh the upfront technology costs. 
• For heavy-duty vehicles, ‘green freight’ programs can collect 
extensive data on fleets and technologies, provide reliable guidance 
on best practices to improve truck efficiency for fleets and accelerate 
                                                
5 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “G20 2014: Overview of 
Australia's Presidency,” 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/G20Australia201
4conceptpaper.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
7 OECD and IEA, “Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map,” (Paris: International 
Energy Agency, 2013). 
8 Drew Kodjak, David Shorr, and Sheila Watson, “G20 Action on Vehicle 
Efficiency and Emissions,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
http://lowyinstitute.org/files/kodjak_shorr_watson_t20_fuel_economy.pdf. 
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efficiency technology adoptions (for example tyres, aerodynamic 
devices).9 
The message Australia has sent to the world is that it wants a focused 
and efficient G20 agenda. With recent declarations by China and the 
United States to increase climate cooperation, and as the world heads to 
the 2015 climate talks, the moment is ripe for further action on climate 
change. By instituting the peer review process for fossil-fuel subsidies 
phase-out, phasing down HFCs through the Montreal Protocol, 
considering the climate dimension of infrastructure investment, and 
working to advance energy efficiency – perhaps with a focus on road 
vehicle fuel economy, even with a streamlined agenda the G20 can still 
take practical actions on climate. 
                                                
9 Drew Kodjak, and Nic Lutsey, “Status and prospects for motor vehicle air 
quality regulations in G20 nations (11 February 2014)”. 
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AMBITIOUS AND PRACTICAL: 
A PRIMARY ASSESSMENT OF 
THE AUSTRALIAN G20 
PRESIDENCY 
 
YONG WANG1 
Peking University 
 
The G20 under Australian presidency has proceeded for four months. 
Generally, it has been a good start and Australia has demonstrated a 
visionary and practical plan towards the Brisbane Summit.  
 
VISION SET WELL FOR BETTER GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 
A global economy needs an effective structure of global governance. 
G20 summitry emerged from the global financial crisis, representing a 
wide recognition of the global nature of the world economy, common 
interests, and the need for a collective effort to strengthen the functioning 
of global governance. The Toronto G20 Summit was a vital step in 
identifying the institution as the ‘premier’ regime of global governance. 
Despite the concerns and scepticism, the G20 process has made some 
great progress. It may be right to argue that compared with the Great 
Depression of 1930s, the world has dealt with the impact in more 
effective and collective ways. But there is no reason for complacency. 
The G20 of today is still far away from the expectation of it delivering 
stable and fair development goals. Therefore, the Australia Government 
has conveyed a strong message to the outside world; it will push forward 
improving the global governance structure. This was elaborated in the 
Davos World Economic Forum remarks by Prime Minister Tony Abbott: 
“Australia is determined, as a responsible and committed G20 chair, to 
promote better global governance”.2 With this mission in mind, the 
Australian G20 presidency has clearly set a plan of action, which is 
                                                
1 Director, Center for International Political Economy Research, Peking 
University. 
2 Tony Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (23 January, 2014),” http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-
01-23/address-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland-0. 
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practical but reflecting a big strategic vision about better global 
governance.  
 
WELL-IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES, FOCUSED AND 
CONCENTRATED  
To some extent, the G20 has become a Christmas tree, on which 
different countries and advocacy groups may attach their own agenda or 
wishes. The agenda list is very long, as evident in some of the G20 
summit declarations. It is extremely important for a host nation to be able 
to avert the driving forces for further agenda extension skillfully, and 
concentrate on the most important mission of the G20 as the premier 
platform for global economic affairs. The Australian Prime Minister’s 
remarks at Davos impressed outside observers with a list of priorities, 
which is short and focused on issues directly related to macroeconomic 
coordination. This includes trade arrangements, international tax, 
infrastructure, and banking. All these issues are about creating a 
supporting environment for investment, creating jobs, and tapping into 
the potential for growth. I can say that the priorities are well set, showing 
the practical approach to the G20 by the Australian Government.  
 
PRACTICAL STEPS COMBINED WITH AN ACTION 
PLAN  
Though the agenda can be concentrated on the most important issues of 
the global economy, it is still easy for G20 meetings to slide into 
becoming a ‘talk shop’, because the parties tend to be engaged in a 
prolonged dispute with each other and feel pressure not to make 
concessions. Any effective G20 meeting must be careful to avoid this 
situation dominating the discussion. We are pleased to find that given 
the issues on the agenda, the G20 presidency has tried to work out a 
scheduled action plan. 
The first meeting of G20 financial ministers and central bank governors 
in Sydney is an encouraging start for this year’s Australian presidency. 
For example, G20 members reached an important agreement on the 
IMF quota and governance reforms in 2010, but the approval of each 
government has been delayed because of the lack of action by the US 
Congress. Obviously, the delayed approval of the IMF quota reform has 
impacted the confidence in the G20 by emerging economies and reform-
minded members, particularly regarding future cooperation. It has 
become more than apparent that emerging economies have been 
underrepresented in the post-WWII international monetary regime. A 
sceptical voice has arisen that the countries like the United States are 
opportunistic about the G20: they promise reform of the IMF when they 
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need the assistance of emerging economies to get them out of the global 
financial crisis, but once the crisis is over, they will shelve the idea of 
reform.3 
In order to preserve the credibility of the G20, it is imperative for all 
members to carry forward the quota and governance program as early 
as they can. The communiqué of the meeting of Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors on 22-23 February 2014 has made this point 
very clearly, not only urging the implementation of the reform but also 
setting the timeframe for action by the United States. As the 
communiqué says, “(w)e deeply regret that the IMF quota and 
governance reforms agreed to in 2010 have not yet become effective 
and that the 15th General Review of Quotas was not completed by 
January 2014”.4 It also emphasises the urgency of seeking approval: 
“Our highest priority remains ratifying the 2010 reforms, and we urge the 
US to do so before our next meeting in April. In April, we will take stock 
of progress towards meeting this priority and completing the 15th 
General Review of Quotas by January 2015”.5 
Another example is international tax reform, and specifically 
implementing the G20/OECD BEPS Action Plan. The February 
communiqué states:  
“by the Brisbane summit, we will start to deliver effective, 
practical and sustainable measures to counter BEPS across all 
industries, including traditional, digital and digitalised firms, in an 
increasingly globalised economy. We endorse the Common 
Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of tax information 
on a reciprocal basis and will work with all relevant parties, 
including our financial institutions, to detail our implementation 
plan at our September meeting. In parallel, we expect to begin 
to exchange information automatically on tax matters among 
G20 members by the end of 2015.“6  
It is good news that an agenda for international taxation cooperation has 
been set. It used to be a difficult field because it involves the complicated 
politics of sovereignty and quarrels between developed and developing 
countries regarding the cross border taxation.  
 
                                                
3 Edwin M. Truman, “IMF Reform Is Waiting on the United States,” 
(Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014). 
4 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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G20-APEC AGENDA LINK: A GOOD EXPERIMENT  
The Australian Government conveyed a strong message that the 
Australian G20 presidency would like to set up links between the 
agendas of the G20 and APEC, and conduct coordination and 
cooperation with China, the APEC summit host in 2014. The aim is to 
promote coordination between the two governance regimes and ensure 
the two agendas are complementary and strengthen each other. The 
potential coordination areas may include infrastructure financing and 
trade liberalisation.  
It would be a brilliant idea to have effective coordination between the 
G20 and APEC which will reduce the possible conflict of objectives 
between a regional organisation and a global regime, and reinforce the 
efforts to improve global governance. As key trading and investment 
partners to each other, Australia and China naturally have strong 
incentives to push forward cooperation on this link. China is an active 
participant in the new regimes of global governance, and the country 
especially welcomes the G20’s emergence as the ‘premier’ platform of 
global economic governance. Moreover, with a new leadership led by 
President Xi Jinping in power, the Chinese Government released a 
comprehensive plan of reform at the end of 2013. Chinese leaders 
believe that in terms of external pressure, bilateral investment treaties 
and free trade areas under negotiation are required to drive the domestic 
reforms. As Beijing hosts the APEC summit meeting in November 2014, 
China has proposed a plan to boost the vision and program of a broader 
Asia-Pacific free trade area.  
Given these factors, it is reasonable to believe that the G20 Australian 
presidency has a good opportunity to leverage China’s APEC agenda 
and that both sides can work together to achieve an early conclusion of 
the WTO Doha round and a more open regional trading system in the 
Asia Pacific area. As part of this cooperation, China and Australia have 
agreed to complete the long-negotiated bilateral FTA. (As expressed by 
Ms Frances Adamson Australian Ambassador to China, Australia hopes 
to strike the deal by the end of 2014).7 In order to achieve these goals, it 
may be advisable for Australian leaders and the public to put aside the 
political and security dispute with regard to China (not similar to the case 
responding to the Chinese Government’s declaration regarding the air 
defence identification zone in December 2013), and beware of the 
possibility that interest groups may reiterate ‘China threat’ statements 
that would disrupt the environment for cooperation between the two 
countries.  
                                                
7 Jingji Caokao Bao, “China-Australia FTA is expected to be reached within 
the year (3 March, 2014) [“Aozhong zimao xieding youwang niannei 
dacheng”], Economic Information Daily: 
http://news.dayoo.com/finance/201403/03/54401_110690296.htm. 
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WEAK AND MISSING POINTS 
First, on banking/finance, a more workable agenda is necessary. The 
communiqué of February 2014 has asserted that  
“(i)n 2014 we are focusing our efforts on substantially 
completing by the Brisbane summit key aspects of the core 
reforms we set out in response to the global financial crisis: 
building resilient financial institutions; ending too-big-to-fail; 
addressing shadow banking risks; and making derivatives 
markets safer. We want to promote resilience in the financial 
system and greater certainty in the regulatory environment to 
support confidence and growth.”8  
Although the communiqué highlights “timely and consistent 
implementation supported by meaningful peer reviews, including OTC 
derivatives reform”, it seems still short on implementation with a 
scheduled action plan. We hope that the G20 members conduct more 
consultation to ensure the reforms happen within a certain timeframe.  
Second, on trade, a G20 trade ministers meeting is expected, but there 
is not enough detail disclosed. Trade should be a high priority and an 
early conclusion of WTO Doha round talks should be taken as one of the 
most important drivers in “creating a climate that facilitates higher 
investment, particularly in infrastructure and small and medium 
enterprises”.9 The G20 meeting should attach more significance to trade 
liberalisation agreements including an early conclusion of WTO Doha 
round negotiation and regional FTAs if they are not in conflict with the 
rules of the WTO. Trade liberalisation can be a useful instrument for 
improving the investment environment and promoting investment in 
infrastructure.  
Third, the G20 Australian presidency may propose to set up a standing 
secretariat of the G20, aimed to effectively lead the policy discussion and 
coordination for better global governance. This function may be a 
necessary step in promoting the efficiency of the G20 regime. 
                                                
8 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014”. 
9 Ibid. 
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PROGRESS ASSESSMENT OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
G20 AGENDA UNDER THE 
2014 AUSTRALIAN 
PRESIDENCY: A GOOD 
STARTING MOMENTUM TO BE 
CONTINUED  
 
MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA1 
World Bank Office Jakarta 
 
The agenda during this year’s G20 presidency is ‘leaner’ compared to 
many of the previous summits, with a clear goal of stronger and resilient 
growth, supported by vigorous and a robust private sector contribution 
and necessary structural reforms. This year’s presidency has focused on 
the core G20 issues that for some years have been ‘lost’ due to the 
proliferation of the G20 agenda, with each G20 host introducing new 
agenda items. G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors have 
reached a consensus to boost global growth by 2 per cent in the next 
five years, and each G20 member country will submit their commitments 
to support this, which will be summarised in a ‘Brisbane Action Plan’. 
One strategy to stimulate growth stands out and has been consistently 
and concertedly championed: infrastructure investment. For resilient 
growth, this year’s presidency has focused on a few main issues: better 
coordination and communication of monetary policies, as well as 
strengthening the tax systems by combatting tax base erosion and profit 
shifting, including a better global exchange of tax information.  
When each G20 country submits its commitments for the ‘Brisbane 
Action Plan’, there are a few things that the IMF and the G20’s Mutual 
Assessment Process must pay attention to. The first is that they must 
identify where the collective 2 per cent increase in global growth comes 
from. In light of declining growths in the BRICS countries – India’s real 
GDP growth rate in 2013 has declined to more than one-half of what it 
was in 2010, China’s real GDP growth in 2013 has declined by about 2.8 
percentage points since 2010, Russia’s real GDP growth rate has 
plummeted to 1.3 per cent in 2013 from 4.5 per cent in 2010, while 
                                                
1 Economist, Consultant, World Bank Office Jakarta. 
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South Africa’s and Brazil’s real GDP growth rates have grown weaker as 
well2 – it is not very clear where the 2 per cent growth will come from. 
Unless there is robust recovery in the United States and the big EU 
countries, it might be difficult to see that the goal will be achieved in the 
coming five years. 
The second is that growth alone is not enough. It must be quality growth 
that must come from necessary structural reforms, fitted to each 
individual country’s needs. The third is that strategic economic 
commitments are not independent from the political environment and 
constituents in each individual country. The failure by the United States 
to ratify the IMF quota and governance reforms agreed in 2010 is just an 
example of how difficult or unpopular it is sometimes to implement 
domestic or international reforms agreed to at the G20. The fourth is the 
fact that, except for a few domestic policies, there is hardly any domestic 
policy whose impact can be confined to the boundaries of the country. 
Most domestic policies – from monetary to trade to investments – have 
‘crossed’ borders. A country can in fact experience a crisis caused by 
spillovers from other countries, even though it has done everything to 
build good fundamentals. Hence, attention must be paid to these 
spillover effects. 
Coordinated monetary policy is a complex issue. It can almost be 
compared to a mythical chimera. The G20 has been and must keep 
talking about how to put it in practice. The easiest way is to say ‘put your 
own house in order’. This means building good fundamentals in one’s 
own country so that spillovers and capital flows volatility will not bring 
down the economy so easily. In some countries, including Indonesia, this 
may mean a deepening of the capital market. Deepening of the capital 
market, especially the bond market, can be a ‘new source’ of a financial 
safety net, in the sense that it could better channel capital inflows into 
more productive investments that stay longer in the country, i.e. are less 
volatile. Azis argues that, of all asset classes, bonds are the most 
relevant asset to support financial safety nets.3 Any efforts to deepen the 
capital market have to come with better legal infrastructure for the 
financial market and a strengthening of the legal systems in general. A 
deepening of the capital market can also be risky without compatible and 
effective macroprudential policy. Policy and regulatory reform to support 
the development of a domestic institutional investor base is also a key to 
a more robust capital market. 
 
                                                
2 Source of figures: CEIC Database, available at http://www.ceicdata.com. 
3 Iwan J. Azis, “Capital Markets as Financial Safety Nets,” in Asian Capital 
Market Development and Integration: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Asian 
Development Bank and Korea Capital Market Institute (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
…growth alone is not 
enough. It must be 
quality growth that must 
come from necessary 
structural reforms, fitted 
to each individual 
country’s needs. 
 THINK20 2014: A PROGRESS REPORT ON AUSTRALIA’S G20 PRESIDENCY 
 
55
 
Regarding infrastructure investment, for many countries – both 
developed and developing – the key question may be how to finance it. 
The G20 this year has put a lot of focus on private sector participation in 
infrastructure financing, through public private partnerships (PPPs) and 
institutional investors. Private sector participation is important not only as 
a source of capital but it can also help with improving efficiencies, 
accountabilities, asset delivery and service performances over the 
lifetime of the projects, as well as the allocation of risks and rewards. 
However, supporting PPPs and institutional investors to invest in long-
term infrastructure projects requires appropriate financial instruments to 
invest long-term, such as infrastructure bonds, as bank loans are often 
limited to shorter-term maturity that could only support the construction 
phases but not the operational phases of long-term infrastructure 
projects. Private sector involvement is not a panacea to addressing the 
financing gap in infrastructure investment. Some infrastructure projects 
are not appropriate for private sector involvement. Moreover, 
experiences from developed countries show that the public sector 
remains the main source of infrastructure financing.  
Therefore, fiscal and tax system reforms remain important for creating 
more ‘space’ for infrastructure spending. In many countries, though, 
there is hardly any room in the national or local budget to increase 
spending in infrastructure. Infrastructure investment should involve 
project prioritisation, broader institutional setting and more quality 
infrastructure spending. More quality infrastructure spending can come 
from less corruption, better quality projects and hence less maintenance 
costs. But, creating more fiscal space for infrastructure financing may 
mean serious political battles for fiscal reforms such as cutting fuel 
subsidies in Indonesia and India. More fiscal space for infrastructure 
financing can also be created by increasing tax revenues through 
improving the tax administration system. The G20 has proposed some 
actions to combat tax base erosion and profit shifting including the 
exchange of tax information. In many countries, this may also involve 
attempts to improve tax collection systems, such as increasing 
compliance and enforcement of personal and corporate taxes through 
stricter auditing of tax reports.  
Australia has recently had tensions with not only Indonesia, but also 
Japan, China and South Korea. Although this has not affected 
cooperation in the G20, if these escalate, it may affect interactions 
between leaders during the G20 summit in November. Hence, 
maintaining good and cooperative diplomacy is necessary for a 
successful summit. 
Private sector 
involvement is not a 
panacea to addressing 
the financing gap in 
infrastructure investment. 
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G20 BRISBANE 2014: SMART, 
INNOVATIVE AND FRESH? 
 
YE YU1 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies 
 
G20 IS GETTING MORE TARGETED IN 2014 
Different from its precedents, Australia G20’s logo is in the shape of an 
animal, which, according to the official notes, is designed to mean “the 
fish and the serpent-smart, innovative and fresh”. By coincidence or not, 
this image perfectly matches Australia presidency’s description about its 
expectation for this year’s G20. When the new Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott publicly elaborated on his plan for the G20 2014 at the 
World Economic Forum on 23 January, he started by declaring this 
year’s theme was about “getting the fundamentals right”. He introduced 
that his government had established a once-in-a-generation Commission 
of Audit to reconsider the size, scope and efficiency of government. Not 
surprisingly, he stated this year’s Brisbane Summit would focus on a few 
key subjects and aim to produce “a communiqué just three pages long”.2 
This was a very refreshing statement since last year the G20 summit at 
Saint Petersburg produced a leaders’ declaration that was 27 pages long 
consisting of 114 paragraphs, and the total number of documents issued 
by the Presidency, the five working groups, international organisations 
and other outreach groups reached 88.3  
On the surface, we have not seen much difference in terms of the length 
of agenda. The G20’s website listed ten items for this year’s agenda: 
anti-corruption, development, employment, energy, financial regulation, 
fiscal and monetary policy, investment and infrastructure, reforming 
global institutions, tax, and trade. A new Investment and Infrastructure 
Working Group was established. Ten documents have been published in 
the first quarter. However, we have seen the top level of the G20 getting 
                                                
1 Research Fellow and Assistant Director, Institute for World Economic 
Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies. 
2 Tony Abbott, “Prime Minister's Address to the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (23 January, 2014),” http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-
01-23/address-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland-0. 
3 20 documents were issued by the Russian presidency, while the number of 
documents submitted by various working groups, international organisations 
and outreach groups were 15, 48 and 3 respectively. The author’s calculation 
based on the source www.g20.org.  
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more determined and smarter. This year’s first G20 Meeting of Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Sydney issued a communiqué 
of only 11 paragraphs, but unprecedentedly put forward a target of lifting 
the collective GDP growth by 2 per cent above the currently projected 
trajectory in the future five years, i.e., “around 0.5 per cent higher on 
average per annum than it would otherwise be”.4 This was quoted by 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang as a legitimate base for his emphasis 
on securing a minimum growth rate for jobs in the press conference on 
13 March 2014.5  
The G20 is trying to strengthen the hierarchy for its agenda so as to 
reduce the increasing burdens for leaders and ministers. This move very 
much resembles the development of the G7 Summit in Tokyo in 1993. 
That year’s G7 Summit Economic Declaration stated at the end:  
“We have reflected on how Summits could best focus our 
attention on the most significant issues of the time. We value 
Summits for the opportunity they provide to exchange views, 
build consensus and deepen understanding among us. But we 
believe Summits should be less ceremonial, with fewer people, 
documents and declarations, and with more time devoted to 
informal discussion among us, so that together we may better 
respond to major issues of common concern. We intend to 
conduct future Summits in this spirit.”6 
The length of the Tokyo Declaration was more than halved and the 
number of documents was sharply reduced. This reflected a call for 
revival of the ‘Spirit of Rambouillet’ that characterised the G7’s birth in 
early 1970s, i.e., leaders should be left to have informal and candid 
dialogues on those most urgent issues. The difference is that the shift 
occurred when the G7 was nearly 20 years old while the G20 has just 
had its five-year anniversary. Reasons for this delay include not only the 
number of G20 members and international organisations, but also rising 
global challenges as well as the rising consciousness of the public for 
participating in global governance. The structure of the world has 
changed and the knowledge of people cannot be reversed. So we must 
be aware that the G20’s agenda cannot be as concise as 40 years ago. 
Observation and research on the G20 require more and more 
professional skills. For political and technical reasons, the proliferation of 
the G20 agenda is almost inevitable. The most we can do is to isolate 
                                                
4 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
5 Li Keqiang, 13 March, 2014: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014lh/premier/ (transcript in Chinese). 
6 G7, “1993 G7 Tokyo Economic Declaration: A Strengthened Commitment to 
Jobs and Growth,” 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1993tokyo/communique/index.html. 
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those expanding agenda items into lower bureaucratic levels and keep a 
balance between efficiency and representation. Australia might lead us 
in this direction to a G20 documentation characterised by a shorter main 
document with heavy annexes. Like the G7 summit in 1993, this year’s 
G20 final document should call on the future G20 summits to be focused 
and streamlined. 
 
TO BE INNOVATIVE IS MORE CHALLENGING 
When Australia’s Treasurer Joe Hockey spoke at the Lowy Institute on 6 
February 2014, he emphasised how his country could act as “an honest 
broker” in “building good bridges with countries of varied backgrounds”. 
Indeed, the G20 is a perfect platform for Australia to come to the centre 
and play a role of a middle power. South Korea was the first to declare 
its middle-power diplomacy in the G20 when it held the chair in 2010.7 
Korea invested enormous resources in the G20 activities and allegedly 
initiated a new alliance named ‘Pivotal Middle Power Group’. However, 
with a conservative government that stresses public expenditure 
reduction, Australia needs more innovation, both intellectual and 
entrepreneurial, to live up to its ambition. 
This is not an easy job. How can the 2 per cent lift of growth be realised? 
The Mutual Assessment Process could not and should not be an 
enforcement mechanism at all. The collective target will depend on 
decentralised actions. Answers seem to lie in the following: prevention 
and preparation for new risks; investment, especially in infrastructure; 
freer trade; better and growth-friendly financial regulation; and effective 
tax cooperation. These are in the right direction, but none of them can be 
taken for granted. For example, first, for the potential ‘third wave’ crisis 
that might originate from some emerging economies,8 the G20’s finance 
ministers are still emphasising their “domestic macroeconomic, structural 
and financial policy frameworks” are to blame for any harm by external 
volatility.9 Emerging economies seem to be calmer than before at the 
G20 about the tampering effect of US monetary policy,10 probably 
                                                
7 Kim Sung-han, “Global Governance and Middle Powers: South Korea's Role 
in the G20 (February, 2013),” http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/global-
governance-middle-powers-south-koreas-role-g20/p30062. 
8 Michael Pettis, “The World Economic Crisis is entering the 3rd Stage”, Can 
Kao Xiao Xi, 7 March 2014.  
9 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014”. 
10 IMF Executive Director Lagarde said surprisingly there were no adversary 
discussions between advanced and emerging economies about this at the 
G20 Finance Ministers meeting. See: Christine Lagarde, “Transcript of a 
Press Conference by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde at the End of 
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because of awareness of the uselessness of any complaint. There are 
many discussions but no serious action about ex-ante coordination of 
different layers of global financial safety nets, i.e., IMF, regional financing 
arrangements, bilateral swaps and national reserves. Ironically, we 
expect the Ukraine crisis could urge the US Congress to approve the 
2010 IMF reform package.11  
Second, the infrastructure financing agenda item is still more a vision 
than reality. Much attention is directed to private sector investment. Mr 
Hockey said “the age of entitlement is over….The age of personal and 
corporate responsibility has begun”.12 There might be some 
misrepresentation. There is no shortage of supply of private capital – the 
key issue is how to better use public funds to leverage private sources. If 
Chinese experience with infrastructure domestically and abroad can be 
seen as a success, the role of public funding and aid for trade cannot be 
ignored. More broadly, when the Chinese Government firmly pursues 
economic reforms, it seeks to enable the market to play “the decisive 
role” while at the same time let the government “play its functions”.13 
Both invisible and visible hands are indispensable. This might also hold 
true for the G20’s infrastructure agenda which should take a more 
balanced position on the complementary roles of public and private 
investment. It will be useful for mobilising more funding from emerging 
countries. This year’s G20 could also promote better integration of its 
infrastructure agenda with regional initiatives, such as APEC’s move for 
increasing regional connectivity. 
Third, the trade agenda is another chronic issue that needs both political 
and intellectual innovation. The concept of global value chains is such a 
fancy, which, however, has not been bought in by major powers in their 
trade policies. As seen previously, strategic considerations are again 
                                                                                                       
a G-20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (23 
February, 2014),” http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2014/tr022314.htm. 
11 At the press conference on 23 February 2014 in Sydney, the US Secretary 
of Treasury Jack Lew talked a lot about IMF reform and Ukraine, without 
mentioning one word about the prevention of harms to some emerging 
economies by US monetary policy change. Jack Lew, “Jack Lew, United 
States Secretary of the Treasury, Sydney, 23 February 2014 - Press 
Conference”, 23 February 2014: 
https://www.g20.org/news/transcripts/jack_lew_united_states_secretary_treas
ury_sydney_23_february_2014_press_conference; Anthony Reyes, “The 
Importance of IMF Reforms to Support Ukraine”, 6 March 2014: 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/IMF-Statements.aspx. 
12 Joe Hockey, “Australia’s Role in Strengthening International Consultation 
and Cooperation, Address to the Lowy Institute”, 6 February 2014: 
http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/speech/001-2014/. 
13 Communist Party of China, “Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of 
the 18th Central Committee of the CPC, Adopted at the Third Plenary Session 
of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 
12, 2013”, 12 November 2013: http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-
01/16/content_31213800_2.htm. 
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becoming the major driver of the trade agenda. G20 members’ trade 
ministers will meet in July this year. In addition to promoting 
transparency, what the G20 can do now is not much more than keeping 
patient. We need time to wait for the big emerging economies to get 
more confident in opening their markets and for established economies 
to be more accustomed to the rise of the rest world. 
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